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MOBILE SERVICES MERGERS
INTRODUCTION
Mergers' in the mobile telecommunications industry are popping up
like worms after a spring rain. The Federal Communications Commission
(the Commission or the FCC) is issuing thousands of local, regional, and
nationwide licenses for Personal Communications Services (PCS), which
are expected to be stitched together into national networks.2 Existing
mobile companies are combining vertically and horizontally,3 and satellite-
based communications systems that will blanket the nation are moving off
the drawing boards and into the air. Sober industry observers predict the
clustering of now separate capabilities-telephone, dispatch, paging, for
example-into a single box for "people on the move."4
All these transactions will involve the transfer of radio licenses and
control over them. Such transfers may not occur without the prior approval
of the Commission under the "public interest" standard of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (the Act).' In granting or withholding its approval under
the "public interest" standard, the Commission must consider the impact
of each transfer on competition.6
1. For brevity, in this Article the term "merger" includes a merger, acquisition, joint
venture, combination, and other transfer of stock, assets, or control. The term also includes
mergers that are merely proposed and under consideration by the Commission. The term
"company" includes corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, and other legal forms
of business entities.
2. See infra notes 107-08, 110 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., In re Bell Atlantic Mobile Systems, Inc. and NYNEX Mobile Comm.
Co., Order, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487 (1995), application for review pending
[hereinafter BAMS-NYNEXI; Transfer of US West, Inc. Cellular Licenses to WMC Partners,
L.P., Public Notice (May 12, 1995); In re Applications of Motorola, Inc. for Consent to
Assign 800Mhz Licenses to Nextel Comm., Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783 (1995), petition
for reconsideration pending [hereinafter Motorola, Inc.]; In re Applications of Nextel
Comm., Inc. for Transfer of Control of OneComm., N.A., and C-Call Corp., Order, 10
FCC Rcd. 3361 (1995) [hereinafter Nextel Communications, Inc.], reconsideration denied
by Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 10450 (1995).
4. See, e.g., McCaw Buys $1.1 Billion in Stock from Nextel to Develop Enhanced 2-
Way Radio, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 6, 1995, at 4, 4-5 (plans to "combine radio dispatch,
duplex telephone interconnect, alphanumeric short message service and future data
capabilities in one device"). See also infra notes 39, 88-90.
5. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1994). Unlike the Department of Justice, which may acquiesce
to a proposed merger, the Commission must affirmatively find that a proposed transfer is
in the public interest, or else the transfer may not occur.
6. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1995),petitionforreh"g
en banc pending on other grounds, aff'g In re Applications of Craig 0. McCaw and
American Tel. & Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836 (1994),
reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd.
11786 (1995) [hereinafter Craig 0. McCaw]; United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (en bane) (In deciding whether a proposed radio license transfer meets the
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
This Article describes the accepted standards for analyzing the
competitive effects of mergers and suggests ways for the Commission to
apply those standards to mergers involving mobile radio telecommunica-
tions services (mobile services).7 No article can exhaust the subject.
Therefore, this Article seeks to state the major issues that should and
should not arise in the Commission's competitive analysis and to suggest
standards by which those issues could be decided.
Part I explains three definitional questions that typically start the
competitive analysis of a merger. The answers to those questions determine
the kind of competitive analysis that the merger will receive when reviewed
by the FCC. Part I also suggests several possible answers to these questions
for mobile services mergers. Part II then explains the analysis by which the
pro- and anti-competitive effects of mergers are usually examined and
evaluated, and highlights the effects that are most likely to be found in a
mobile services merger. Finally, Part II surveys the remedies for the harms
to competition likely to result from such a merger.
I. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
The typical preliminary step in a competitive analysis of a merger is
to answer three questions. The first two questions are: "What is the
'product market'?" and "What is the 'geographic market'?" Answers to
these questions are a prerequisite for answering the basic question of
whether the merger will help or hurt competition. The answers pinpoint
exactly what kind of competition, if any, is involved in the merger, in
exactly what business, and where. Within those limits, the substantive
analysis of the merger begins with the third question: "Which of three
"public interest" standard of the Communications Act, the Commission must "seriously
[consider] the antitrust consequences of a proposal and [weigh) those consequences with
other public interest factors.").
In addition, the Commission has express authority over mergers of "common carriers
engaged in ... radio communications or radio transmissions of energy" under the Clayton
Act, which prohibits mergers "in any line of commerce.., in any section of the country"
where the effect may be "substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopo-
ly." 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21(a) (1994). The Commission seldom invokes this authority,
however, because its authority under the Communications Act is usually sufficient to
authorize whatever actions the Commission wishes to take concerning a merger. See, e.g.,
Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 7, 9 & n.25.
7. For a general discussion of how regulatory agencies such as the Commission apply
antitrust and economic principles under the "public interest" standard of regulatory statutes,
such as the Communications Act, see Northeast Utilities Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937,
947-48 (1st Cir. 1993); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 391 (1991); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 82, 88
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353, 364 (D.D.C.
1980).
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classifications best fits the merger-horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate?"
A. The Product Market
1. Generally
For each party to a merger, at least one product market must be
defined. The United States Supreme Court, in its classic statement of what
a product market is, said in Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States that
"[t]he outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it."9 In that case, the
Supreme Court found three product markets-men's, women's and
children's shoes. It chose not to find either one big product market for all
shoes or hundreds of product markets for shoes of different sizes, ages, and
styles. The Supreme Court based its finding on evidence of the public's
recognition of the severability of men's, women's, and children's shoes,
their manufacture in separate plants, the existence of peculiar characteristics
of each kind of shoe that made it generally noncompetitive with the others,
and the existence of distinct classes of customers for each kind of shoe.1"
The Supreme Court has followed basically the same approach in similar
cases, emphasizing reasonable interchangeability as shown by evidence of
the actual behavior of consumers."
8. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
9. Id. at 325. Although Brown Shoe is almost thirty-five years old and might be
decided differently on the merits if it were decided today, its criteria for defining product
markets are still followed. See, e.g., Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 201
& n.8 (3d Cir. 1994); U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 995 (11th
Cir. 1993); Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-54 &
n.9 (W.D. Ark. 1995); In re Application of General Electric Co., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 8207, para. 10 & n.29 (1989).
There is cross-elasticity of demand between two services if a change in the price of one
causes a change in demand for the other. For example, if an increase in the price of cellular
service would increase or decrease the demand for paging service, then cellular service has
cross-elasticity of demand with paging service. See D.W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 920 (1994). See also Community
Publishers, Inc., 892 F. Supp. at 1153 & n.7 (citing SuperTurf, Inc. v. Honsanto Co., 660
F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1981)).
10. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326-328. The Supreme Court cautioned against drawing
product markets too narrowly. "[The boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with
sufficient breadth to include the competing products of each of the merging companies and
to recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists." Id. at 326.
11. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
The Supreme Court stated that a product "market is composed of products that have
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced-price, use and
qualities considered." Id. at 404. "This interchangeability is largely gauged by the purchase
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There are a few "short rules" about defining product markets. First,
a product market may be a cluster of different products or services that is
"sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities."'"
Second, two services may be in the same product market even if they are
not identical, or even fungible, so long as there is demonstrated competi-
tion between them. 3 Third, many distinctions that people in a business
consider important, such as technology (e.g., analog versus digital) and
regulatory classifications (e.g., common carrier versus private), are
probably irrelevant to the "reasonable interchangeability" test. What
matters most are the perception and actual behavior of customers. If a
digital call and an analog call sound the same to a consumer (and all other
things are equal), both are probably in the same product market.' 4 Fourth,
within a product market, there may be one or more submarkets. That is a
of competing products for similar uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability
of the competing commodities." Id. at 380-81. DuPont was followed in Satellite Business
Systems, Memorandum Opinion, Order, Authorization and Certification, 62 F.C.C.2d 997,
1073-74, para. 218, reconsideration denied by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 64
F.C.C.2d 872 (1977), aff'd sub nom., United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 97 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1974). Thus, in a leading
decision about bank mergers, the Supreme Court defined a product market of "the cluster
of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust
administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking'." United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
13. For example, the Supreme Court found glass and metal containers and all end uses
for which they compete to be in the same product market, despite clear differences in their
production methods, prices, and possible uses. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441, 449-53 (1964). The Supreme Court was convinced by evidence showing that over
the years the manufacturers of glass and metal containers had competed for the same
customers (e.g., baby food companies, beer brewers), and each had won over some of the
other's customers. Id.
A later case described the Supreme Court's decision in Continental Can as an examina-
tion of "the substitution of containers in certain end uses, the attempts by producers to
expand their market shares, and [the fact] that producers took the pricing of the competing
container into account in marketing their own product. The structure, history, and probable
future of the industries involved were also considered." FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681
F. Supp. 27, 34-35 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.
1988). The court in Owens-Illinois, found a broader product market of "rigid-walled
containers," including not only glass and metal containers, but also plastic and paper ones.
Id. at 46, 54-55. Again, the court was convinced by evidence that showed manufacturers
of each product competing with the others for the same customers. See also United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 491 (1974) (noting the district court's finding
of a product market of "energy," consisting of coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, and
geothermal power).
14. See, e.g., In re Application of MCI Comm. Corp. and Southern Pac. Tel. Co.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 1072, para. 15 (1994).
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section of a market which has enough distinctive characteristics that it is
treated as part of a market and as a separate market in its own right.15
The Supreme Court's "reasonable interchangeability" test for defining
product markets is subjective and somewhat imprecise. As the Court itself
has said, "[N]o more definite rule can be declared than that commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes" constitute
one product market.' 6 If the test is applied loosely, it can lead to product
markets that are so broad that almost any merger within those markets will
not seem to threaten competition.' 7
An alternative and purportedly more precise test for defining a
product market can be found in the most recent Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.'" The
Horizontal Guidelines focus on one factor, price, and even more specifical-
ly on the effect of price increases on consumers' behavior." Under the
Horizontal Guidelines, a product market is "a product or group of products
such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present
and future seller of those products ... likely would impose at least a
'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price."'20 The
Horizontal Guidelines restate this definition in terms of a test. To determine
whether Product A is in the same market as Product B, ask whether, if all
15. Submarkets are defined by much the same factors as markets. Continental Can, 378
U.S. at 457-58; Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Some
later cases disparage the idea of submarkets, reasoning that something is either a full-
fledged product market or it is not. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 208
n.16 (3rd Cir. 1994) ("The use of the term 'submarket' is somewhat confusing."); Satelliie
TV & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 714 F.2d
351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) ("The term 'submarket' is to be avoided; it adds only
confusion to an already imprecise and complex endeavor."); Community Publishers, Inc.
v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 n.9 (W.D. Ark. 1995) ("[T]he term 'submarket'
is unnecessary.").
16. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
17. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1810-18 (1990).
18. Dep't. of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,532 [hereinafter Horizontal
Guidelines]. The FCC has not adopted the Horizontal Guidelines as rules. See Craig 0.
McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, para. 10 n.27 (1994); United
Telecommunications, Inc. and U.S. Telephone, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1306, para. 21 n.13 (1984).
19. This is part of cross-elasticity of demand, which is one component of the Supreme
Court's "reasonable interchangeability" test. See supra nn. 9, 11, 13.
20. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.11, at 20,572. If the firm could profit
from price discrimination among its customers in a product market, the Horizontal
Guidelines may treat each such group of customers as a separate product market. Id.,
§ 1.12, at 20,573.
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the sellers of Product A increased their prices by 5 percent-and not
because of increased costs-for one year,2 ' would enough buyers shift to
buying Product B so that the price increase would prove unprofitable for
the sellers of Product A.' In other words, if all cellular service providers
raised their prices by 5 percent for one year,' would the increased
revenues from their remaining cellular customers more than offset their
losses from customers who switched to a cheaper substitute prod-
uct-paging services, for example. If the cellular providers suffer a net
loss, then paging belongs in the product market with cellular service.
The Five Percent Question has drawbacks. First, it has been criticized
for inevitably leading to unduly narrow product markets24-- just as the
"reasonable interchangeability" test has been criticized for leading to
unduly broad ones. Second, the Five Percent Question is hypothetical. One
source for the answer to the hypothetical question is the executives of the
merging companies or their experts, whose opinions are likely to be self-
serving.' A more reliable answer to the question could be obtained by a
professional survey of buyers of Product A, asking what they would do in
the event of a 5 percent price increase. Such a survey, however, is
expensive and somewhat impractical for litigation at the FCC, and it would
21. Although the Horizontal Guidelines do not prescribe the use of 5% and one year
in all cases, those numbers are used in daily application. See Andrew C. Hruska, Note, A
Broad MarketApproach to Antitrust Product Market Definition in Innovative Industries, 102
YALE L.J. 305, 323 (1992). See also Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.11, at
20,572.
22. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.11, at 20,572. See also United States
v. E.I. du Pont du Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956) ("If a slight decrease in the
price of cellophane causes a considerable number of customers for other flexible wrappings
to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand
exists between them; that the products compete in the same market.").
23. This Article will refer to this test as the Five Percent Question. When asking the
Five Percent Question, the price used must be the price that would be charged in a
competitive market, free of regulation, or "coordinated interaction." Horizontal Guidelines,
supra note 18, § 1.11, at 20,573. In the cellular industry, there has been some price
regulation and many structural and historical incentives to coordinated interaction. See infra
nn. 161-64.
24. See, e.g., Hruska, supra note 21, at 308 n.17, 313 n.44 ; Gina M. Killian, Note,
Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice's Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Critique
and Proposal, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 857, 884-88 (1994) (describing longstanding
disagreement about the relevant market in bank mergers between the Department of Justice,
which finds relatively narrow markets, and federal banking regulators, who find relatively
broad markets).
25. Even if the merging companies had data on how a 5% price increase would affect
sales, the application of the Horizontal Guidelines's test requires a simultaneous and
identical price increase by all their competitors. Such a chain of events is extremely
unlikely. Competitors would also have to make their own sales results available to the
merging parties and the FCC.
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still yield only a hypothetical answer.'
The FCC is not required to make a decision between the Supreme
Court's "reasonable interchangeability" test and the Horizontal Guidelines'
Five Percent Question. However, the FCC has consistently used the
Supreme Court's test of reasonable interchangeability.' Therefore, this
Article will assume that the Commission will continue to rely primarily on
the Supreme Court's "reasonable interchangeability" test for defining
product markets. The definition of the product market is often the single
decisive issue in merger cases-and, in the context of the Commission,
competitive analyses of mergers. Therefore, great attention may be given
to defining product markets in mobile services merger cases. The following
subsection describes the leading candidates for inclusion in that market.
2. Mobile Services
If both parties to a mobile services merger provide a particular
service, then that service will certainly be in the product market. Defining
this service provides the starting point in determining the product market.
The next step is to ask what other services are reasonably interchangeable
and, therefore, also belong in that product market. The following is a
description of all the services which, as of the time of publication, might
belong in the product market in a mobile services merger.' Each
26. The Author knows of no merger litigation in the FCC in which the results of such
a survey have been introduced into evidence.
27. Some Commission decisions have referred to the Horizontal Guidelines' test, but
have not applied it. In this respect, the Commission is consistent with reported court
decisions in merger cases, not one of which has defined a product market by using the Five
Percent Question exclusively. See, e.g., Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, para. 10 (1994); BAMS-NYNEX, Order,.77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1487, para. 17 (1995).
28. The following descriptions and some other parts of this Article draw heavily from,
and sometimes paraphrase, the Commission's first annual report to Congress about
competition in commercial mobile radio services (CMRS). In re Implementation of Section
6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, First Report, 10 FCC Rcd.
8844 (1995) [hereinafter CMRS First Annual Report]. For another detailed description of
the various mobile radio services in the United States, see NAT'L TELECOMM. AND
INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 88-21, CHARTING THE
COURSE FOR A NEW CENTURY 283-99 (1988).
CMRS is a category created by Congress to encompass all mobile telecommunications
services that are provided for profit and make interconnected service available to the public
(or to such classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of
the public, as specified by the FCC). See 47 U.S.C. § 332 (c)(1) (1994); 47 C.F.R. § 20.3
(1995); In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Second
Reportand Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, paras. 39-70 (1994) [hereinafter CMRS Second Report
and Order]. CMRS providers consist of cellular, interconnected specialized mobile radio
(SMR), paging, air-ground, satellite-based, maritime, broadband and narrowband PCS
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description focuses on those facts which are most relevant to the services
inclusion vel non in the relevant product market under both the "reasonable
interchangeability" test and the Five Percent Question.
a. Cellular Mobile Telephone Service
Cellular service consists of simultaneous two-way voice communica-
tions with functions and privacy that are virtually identical to home and
office telephone service via a mobile telephone.2 9 Originally, the service
was almost entirely in vehicles, but portable phones now account for one-
half of all sales-a share that is expected to grow. The Commission licenses
only two cellular systems per area.3" Each system uses 25 MHz of
spectrum.
Cellular service has been in existence for more than thirteen years
growing at the astounding rate of 50 percent per year. It now has
approximately 24 million customers. In most markets, the two systems
have roughly the same market share. A typical cellular customer's monthly
bill is sixty dollars. Evidence shows that some cellular carriers, especially
those in major cities, are earning rates of return vastly higher than a
competitive market would allow.3' Recently, however, cellular charges
have begun to decline, and features have begun to increase-a trend widely
attributed to cellular carriers' anticipation of competition from PCS.
32
Except in a few rural areas where only one license has been sought, there
systems, and interconnected private Business Radio systems. Id. para. 139. Congress also
created, and the Commission defined, another category called private mobile radio systems
(PMRS), which includes all mobile radio communications systems that are not CMRS. See
47 U.S.C. § 332 (c)(2) (1994); 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.3, 20.9 (1994).
29. Each service described in this subsection as being "voice" or "telephone" service
is also capable of data and facsimile applications. For brevity's sake, however, only "voice"
or "telephone" service will be mentioned. For the same reason, the word "telephone"
should be understood to include terminal equipment for nonvoice uses.
30. For a discussion on the size of these areas, see infra p. 277. CMRS Second Report
and Order includes cellular "resellers" within the definition of CMRS. Resellers buy
cellular service in bulk from one or both system operators and resell it to consumers, thus,
competing with system operators at the retail or "street" level. Except in a few states where
state regulators have protected them to varying degrees, cellular resellers have little or no
competitive significance. CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 37.
31. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. Tables 9-11. These higher earnings are
expected in a duopoly in which there is ever growing demand and absolute barriers to entry
exist. "[T]he Commission has previously acknowledged that, while competition in the
provision of cellular services exists, the record does not support a conclusion that cellular
services are fully competitive." CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 138.
See also CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 4.
32. See infra p. 272.
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is no room for entry by new providers of cellular service.33
b. Specialized Mobile Radio Systems
Specialized Mobile Radio Systems (SMRs) provide "dispatch" service,
a two-way voice communications system for business vehicles (e.g.,
taxicabs, delivery trucks) that talk with each other and a central dispatch-
erY SMR terminals are not as compact as cellular ones and, therefore,
are almost always limited to vehicles. However, some portable units do
exist and are expected to become more common. For over a decade, SMRs
have been authorized to connect the public switched telecommunications
network (PSTN), which enables them to offer telephone service that is
functionally equivalent to cellular service. Thus, the FCC has found that
cellular and interconnected SMRs are now competitive with each other, and
the competition between them is likely to grow.35 In actual practice,
however, SMRs appear not to have engaged in direct, visible competition
with cellular carriers, At the end of 1993, approximately 1.8 million
vehicles were served by SMR systems. A typical SMR customer pays
fifteen dollars per month for dispatch service and fifty dollars more for
interconnection to the PSTN. Thus, the average SMR customer who obtains
interconnection to the PSTN receives a monthly bill equivalent to that
received by the average customer of cellular service.
Unlike cellular systems, SMRs have no Commission-ordained
numerical limit per area and no fixed number of MHz per system. The
33. For more concerning cellular service, see generally CMRS FirstAnnual Report, 10
FCC Rcd. paras. 13-28. Mobile telephone services using technologies that predated cellular
service are still available, but in an ever-diminishing number of areas. 47 C.F.R. § 22.561
(1995).
34. The primary use of SMRs is for voice communication, but some SMRs are devoted
primarily to data communications, including facsimile.
35. In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Third
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, paras. 73, 261-62 (1994) [hereinafter CMRS Third
Report and Order].
36. See CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 141-43 ("Although
interconnected SMRs may ... be considered in competition with cellular carriers, [they]
have a small share of the mobile telephone business and do not exercise market power.").
"Market power is the power to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in
a competitive market. . . . It has been defined as the ability of a single seller to raise price
and restrict output." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
464 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Horizontal Guidelines, § 0.1
at 20.570-71. (concluding that SMR licenses face competitive disadvantages and do not at
present appear to have market power in the mobile telephone market). In markets such as
mobile services, where competition is on the rise, market power might be defined
negatively-the failure to lower price and increase output. See Michael H. Riordan &
Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 513, 539 n.63 (1995).
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total amount of spectrum available for all SMRs in an area presently will
be 21 MHz.37 The largest SMR, Nextel, began consolidating local SMRs
a few years ago and at one time aspired to be the third cellular network.38
Recently, however, Nextel lowered its sights to serving "mobile working
groups" with an innovative, "bundled" offering of telephone, dispatch, and
paging service.39 Some frequencies allocated for SMRs are still available,
even in urban areas.' Dispatch communications also occur on private and
federal government systems, which are discussed below.
c. Paging Service
Paging service consists primarily of a small portable receiver that
emits a beep, vibrates, or displays a telephone number on a screen when
someone calls the customer. In practical effect, the signal alerts the
subscriber to call a phone number which replays the message that the caller
left via voice mail, answering service, or other device. More sophisticated
forms of paging include receiving a short message (e.g., a telephone
number to call, a few words, or a voice message). There are many
competing carriers in most areas, and the Commission has concluded that
"the paging industry is highly competitive."
41
Approximately 4.5 MHz currently are used for paging service. Since
the service mostly consists of momentary signals rather than conversations,
this relatively small amount of spectrum now accommodates 27.3 million
subscribers and could accommodate many more. Over 30 percent of
cellular customers also subscribe to paging service. A typical monthly rate
for paging service is between nine and seventeen dollars and depends on
the service or "coverage" area and functions that the customer desires. Of
the spectrum allocated to paging service, almost all is in use in major urban
37. SMR frequencies are in three bands in the radio frequency spectrum. In the 800
MHz band, there are approximately 14 MHz now available for use. In the 900 MHz band,
approximately 5 MHz are allocated. Some of them are in use, and the rest are expected to
be available for use in 1996. In the 220 MHz band, approximately 2 MHz are allocated and
are expected to be available for use in 1996. In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Comm'n's
Rules to Provide for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private Land Mobile Radio
Service, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order and Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 46,564 (FCC 1995).
38. Gautam Naik, For Nextel, '94 Was Best of Times and Worst of Times, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 3, 1995, at A14; Mike Mills, Nextel to Buy Wireless Competitor, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 1994, at D1, D8.
39. McCaw Buys $1.1 Billion in Stock from Nextel to Develop Enhanced 2-Way Radio,
supra note 4, at 4.
40. For more concerning SMRs, see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras.
35-39.
41. CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 140.
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areas. However, spectrum allocated to cellular service and subcarriers on
some television and FM radio stations may also be used for paging service.
This provides additional capacity for entry by new competitors.42
d. Air-Ground Service
Air-ground service consists of telephone service on airplanes. In its
principal form, it allows calls to be placed from commercial planes, but not
to them. A call costs approximately one and a half dollars per minute
regardless of the distance between the aircraft and the point in the United
States called. The operation of cellular terminals on airplanes in-flight is
forbidden for safety reasons, which greatly reduces possible competition
between cellular service and air-ground service.4' Approximately 4.5
MHz are assigned to all types of air-ground service. There are three
competing providers of air-ground service, none of which dominates.
Licenses for three more carriers are available for issuance by the FCC, so
there is room for entry by new carriers.'
e. Satellite Systems for Mobile Communications
Several mobile satellite systems provide mobile telephone service in
the United States. Telephones that use satellite-based systems are so large
they require a car or a backpack to transport them, and charges are several
times higher than those for cellular service. The present satellite-based
service is only marketed to, and attractive in, extremely rural areas and,
therefore, is not considered reasonably interchangeable with other forms of
mobile telephone service.'n Interchangeable satellite systems are expected
in several years.'
f. Maritime Services
Telephone services to ships and fixed offshore installations such as oil
42. For more concerning paging service, see CMRS FirstAnnual Report, 10 FCC Rcd.
paras. 29-34.
43. 47 C.F.R. § 22.925 (1995).
44. For more concerning air-ground service, see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC
Rcd. paras. 40-41.
45. As the Commission stated in the CMRS Third Report and Order, "[c]urrently,
providers of [mobile satellite systems] expect to serve as a complement to terrestrial
services for the most part since their service will be relatively expensive and therefore
generally will not be a constraining factor on the price of terrestrial services." CMRS Third
Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 269.
46. These are Low Earth Orbit (LEO) systems, which will have 3.5 MHz for primarily
nonvoice communications and 33 MHz for voice and nonvoice communications. LEOs are
not expected to provide service on a significant scale until 2000. For more concerning
satellite-based mobile services, see CMRS FirstAnnual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras. 42-43.
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rigs are provided by stations on land-public coast stations-and by
satellites other than those just mentioned. Public coast stations provide
service in a small area, typically up to thirty miles from the shore. The
satellites have regional or national coverage. Some public coast stations
compete with each other; satellites compete with all of them.47 Public
coast stations use approximately 15 MHz of spectrum, and satellites use 19
MHz of spectrum, for a total of almost 34 MHz. While these services are
necessary for the protection of life and property on the water, much of
their actual use is for business and personal communications. They are
thought to be competitive with cellular service in coastal harbors and on
other popular recreational bodies of water, where vessels already have
telephones that use public coast stations and cellular customers may take
their cellular phones on board.48
g. Personal Communications Service
The Commission has allocated the relatively large amount of 153
MHz of spectrum for PCS and has divided it into three categories:
broadband, narrowband, and unlicensed. The Commission intends PCS to
inject significant new competition into mobile services.
1. Broadband PCS
In contrast to the systems and services described above, broadband
PCS allocations may be used-for any mobile service-telephone, dispatch,
data, paging, and/or video, for example.49 This flexible definition is far
less regulatory than the Commission's traditional approach to mobile
services and makes broadband PCS something of a "wild card" in the
marketplace. Broadband PCS has an allocation of 120 MHz, which will be
licensed by auction in six blocks, three of 30 MHz each and three of 10
MHz each. However, service to most of the country is not expected until
1996 at the earliest. The principal initial application of broadband PCS will
likely be for mobile telephone service.5" Broadband PCS will make
47. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning Maritime Communica-
tions, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 7863, paras. 34-
35 (1992).
48. For more concerning maritime services, see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC
Rcd. para. 44.
49. See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications
Act-Competitive Bidding, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 8 FCC Rcd. 7635, para. 116
(1993) (affirming earlier definition of PCS as a "wide array of mobile, portable and
ancillary communications services to individuals and businesses").
50. FCC Plans Monthly Sales for IVDS, SMR, MMDS and 10-MHz PCS Spectrum,
COMM. DAILY, June 6, 1995, at 1,1 ("CTIA Pres. Thomas Wheeler said PCS is 'just more
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possible the entry of three to six new competitors in the areas of existing
cellular carriers, SMRs, and all other mobile service providers."1 Opinions
about the future success of broadband PCS differ. 2
2. Narrowband PCS
Narrowband PCS received an allocation of 3 MHz from the
Commission; these are expected to be used for sophisticated forms of
paging, such as two-way paging. 3 All licenses have been issued, and
service is expected to begin in 1996.
3. Unlicensed PCS
Unlicensed PCS received an allocation of 30 MHz from the Commis-
sion; 10 MHz of which is expected to be used for voice communications,
and 20 MHz for data. Unlicensed PCS devices will likely consist of new
cordless telephones, wireless telephone and data networks within offices,
spectrum'."); Gautam Naik, No Big Deal?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at R16 ("PCS
technology ... will do almost nothing that cellular service won't also be capable of or in
some cases can do already. PCS, in fact, is shaping up more as a strategic supplement than
as a communications revolution."); Gautam Naik, Craig 0. McCaw Confounds the Giants
with His Wild and Wooly PCS Bidding, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1995, at BI, B7 ("Mr.
McCaw sees the next generation of wireless as less than revolutionary. 'Basically,' he says,
PCS is 'cellular at a different frequency'."). But see FCC Plans Monthly Sales for 1VDS,
SMR, MMDS and 10-MHz PCS Spectrum, supra, at 1 ("Industry representatives predicted
PCS services would exceed cellular in reliability, coverage and price, especially with new
services not available from cellular.").
51. See Summary of Federal Communications Commission Presents En Bane Meeting
on PCS Issues, Panels I and II (Apr. 11, 1994). Cellular carriers in an area are allowed to
be licensed for one of the smaller broadband blocks thus adding 10 MHz to a cellular
carrier's existing 25 MHz. See infra note 142.
52. Compare CMRS FirstAnnual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 61 ("PCS... is virtually
certain... to intensify competition at all levels.") with London Calling, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 5, 1995, at 60, 60 (disappointing initial sales for PCS in the United Kingdom);
Moody's Sees Expensive Road Ahead for PCS Providers, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 24, 1995,
at 7, 7 (An investment analyst estimates that "PCS services won't be widely available until
'well into the next century,' meaning cellular companies will have [an] advantage 'for a few
more years and are likely to have ample time to prepare for new entrants'."); and Charles
Mason, AirTouch Execs Say PCS Will Play Small Role, TELEPHONY, Apr. 18, 1994, at 12,
12 (paraphrasing the president of AirTouch, the recently divested cellular subsidiary of
Pacific Bell, as saying that cellular carriers' more than ten-year head start over PCS
providers is virtually insurmountable, and estimating that it will take PCS carriers seven or
eight years to deploy networks as ubiquitous as cellular ones, and by that time cellular
carriers will have improved their networks even further).
53. FCC Plans Monthly Sales for IVDS, SMR, MAIDS and 10-MHz PCS Spectrum,
supra note 50 ("Mtel Pres.-COO Bernard Puckett said studies show his paging customers
are willing to pay 20-50% premiums for 2-way service and said pricing structure will be
established to control early customer signups. His company already is testing 2-way service
in Washington, D.C., but isn't available commercially." Id. at 2.).
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and other kinds of short-range telecommunications of an internal and
business nature. At present, its basic functions appear likely to be short-
distance telephone calls using switchboards or the PSTN, and short-distance
dispatch and paging services. 4'
h. Private Mobile Radio Systems
All the services described above are "common carrier" services,
which are offered to the general public for a price. 5 In addition, the
Commission has made large frequency allocations for an array of "private"
mobile communications systems, which serve the internal needs for voice
and other communications of specific types of businesses and state or local
government entities. 6 Private systems may be interconnected with the
PSTN under certain conditions, thus, allowing use for mobile telephone
service. 7 While many communications on these systems are very
specialized (e.g., taking the temperature of railroad tracks in remote areas
and reading pressure gauges in underground storage facilities), some are
simply business persons engaging in telephone or dispatch conversations in
ways that could occur via the common carrier services described above.58
Allocations for such systems total approximately 70 MHz. Private mobile
systems existed before the first "public" ones, and today they boast
approximately 15 million transmitters in use and equipment valued at up to
$30 billion, which makes them comparable in size to the cellular industry.
By definition, "rates" are not charged by private systems. The spectrum for
54. For more concerning PCS, see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras. 45-
50; Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 16, 1995, at 3, 3 (unlicensed PCS system for
"workers [who] are often away from their desks but need to be accessible.").
55. For a definition of the term "common carrier," see National Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992
(1976).
56. Examples include communications within factories or department stores, or between
the headquarters and mobile units of a police force. Private systems may provide service
on a for profit basis to others.
57. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Prescribe Policies and
Regulations to Govern the Interconnection of Private" Land Mobile Systems with the Public
Switched Telephone Network in the Bands 806-821 and 851-866 MHz, Second Report and
Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 741, paras. 37-39 (1982), on reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 1111 (1983).
58. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 12 ("[AIII reclassified private
mobile radio services actually compete, or have the potential to compete within a reasonable
time period, with existing commercial mobile radio services."). Many businesses use a
mixture of their own private systems and common carrier services, usually cellular and
paging, to meet their total need for mobile telecommunications. For an example of a
business whose communications needs could be met by cellular, SMR, or private systems,
see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 53 & n.109.
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private systems is used in all urban areas; there is little vacant spectrum
elsewhere. s9
1. "Low End" Mobile Radio Systems
Citizens Band (CB) radios and walkie-talkies allow two-way voice
communications with each other, with no privacy and within a range of up
to 150 miles of each other. They are used largely for recreational purposes,
but some personal and business communications occur on them. These
services have a combined frequency allocation of approximately 2 MHz. 60
2. Federal Government Systems
The federal government uses a large amount of spectrum for its
mobile communications needs, independent of the Commission's regulatory
authority. Some of the communications provided on this spectrum are
similar to the services described above, and there is anecdotal evidence of
some interchangeability.61
3. Plain Old Telephone Service
Mobile services are interchangeable with traditional wireline local-
exchange telephone service, sometimes called plain old telephone service
(POTS), in the sense that both provide communications within a local area,
with access to long-distance services.62 In practical effect, however, the
interchangeability of mobile services with POTS has been minimal because
of mobile systems' relatively high prices and limited capacities.63 The
59. For more about private mobile radio communications services, see CMRS First
Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras. 51-55; CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
paras. 71-99.
60. For more about these services, see In re Elimination of Individual Station Licenses
in Radio Control Radio Services and Citizens Band Radio Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,884
(1983) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 95.401, 95.407(f), 95.420 (1994)).
61. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 61 & n.126. The federal
government is also in the process of reallocating 200 MHz from government use to private-
sector uses. The Commission has earmarked some of this spectrum for mobile radio
services, but it is not expected to be in use for several years, and even then, the frequencies
may not be useable for substitutes for the services described herein. In re Allocation of
Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, FirstReport and Order
and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 314 (1995).
62. This was one of the original rationales for allowing "wireline" carriers to provide
mobile services. See, e.g., In re The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, Decision,
22 F.C.C.2d 1244, 1251 (1957) (For a wireline local exchange carrier to provide paging
service "is a logical extension of its telephone service.").
63. In re Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's
Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469,
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
only significant interchangeability that has been detected to date is between
cellular service and coin or "pay" telephones. Both are accessible to
persons who are away from home or office and happen to have car or
portable telephones as well.' Optimists, however, believe that rates for
broadband PCS and cellular services will fall low enough to be real
competitors for POTS and that the former services will have enough
capacity to threaten a significant amount of telephone companies' POTS
revenues.65 The Commission has shown no desire to prevent such
competition.
3. A Note about Terminal Equipment
All services described above require the use of either a telephone or
another kind of "terminal equipment." Typically, the customer buys or
rents a terminal from the chosen carrier.6 In addition, most terminals
may be used for only one service (e.g., cellular or paging) and sometimes
for only one carrier's service.67 This "bundling" of service and terminals
para. 32, at 484 (1981). See also In re Applications of James F. Rill, Trustee for Comet
Inc., and Pacific Telesis Group, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 583, para. 37 (1986) ("CELLULAR service is properly viewed not as a substitute for
WIRELINE local exchange service, but as a COMPLEMENT to landline communications
..* .. this adjunct to their WIRELINE local exchange facilities ....") (capitalization in
original). See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,987,
1986 WL 931, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1986).
64. Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, para. 14
n.36, at 5847 (1994) (noting substitution between interexchange calls from pay telephones
and from cellular telephones).
65. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 75 n.155. See also Telephony,
COMM. DAILY, July 13, 1995, at 5, 6 (PCS licensee Wirelessco "emphasized their service
isn't merely competitor to cellular but also will compete with local exchange companies."
Id. at 6.)
Several other aspects of cellular service, in particular, limit its interchangeability with
POTS. One is the carriers' common practice of charging cellular customers for calls they
receive-a practice that is unknown in POTS and makes many cellular customers reluctant
to receive calls. Cellular carriers also require each cellular telephone to have a unique
telephone number and impose significant monthly charges, typically about $20, for each
telephone. These practices prevent cellular service from being a practical substitute for
POTS, which allows consumers to have any number of extension telephones with the same
telephone number at no extra charge. The Commission has posed no obstacle to carriers
changing their practices so as to offer "real" extension service. See In re Revision of Part
22 of the Commission's Rules Governing the Public Mobile Services, Report and Order,
9 FCC Rcd. 6513, para. 59 (1994), petition for reconsideration pending on other grounds.
66. The only major exception is cellular service; significant sales of telephones occur
independently of the service. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 25 & nn.27,
38.
67. Most SMR terminals may be used only on the system of one SMR. Broadband PCS
terminals also are not required to be useable on all broadband PCS systems, and they will
not likely be so. The Commission, in order to facilitate customers changing from one
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creates a barrier to interservice and intercarrier competition, where for
example, customers fleeing from an unjustified 5 percent price increase will
probably need to scrap their existing terminals and buy new ones. In some
cases, this cost could be so high as to amount to a significant barrier to
interchangeability, possibly even creating a self-contained product market
of "locked in" customers for one service or one carrier.68
4. The Product Market In Mobile Services Mergers
Findings about which services compete with each other on a
nationwide basis may occur in the Commission's decisions regarding
rulemaking proceedings. These findings are a good starting point for
defining the product market for a specific merger.69 Each merger probably
cellular carrier to another, originally required all cellular telephones to be capable of using
both carriers' frequencies. In 1988, the Commission rescinded this rule. Id. para. 16 n.15.
No other service described in this subsection has ever had such a rule, and there is no
prospect of such a rule for PCS. See, e.g., FCC Plans Monthly Sales for IVDS, SMR,
MMDS and 10-MHz PCS Spectrum, supra note 50, at 2 (The industry "[p]anel also.agreed
that [government] shouldn't set standards for new technology, with Wayne Perry, vice
[chairman] of AT&T Wireless, comparing that action with freezing computer standards with
near-obsolete 286 chip. Rather, they said, companies should be free to offer whatever
services at whatever technical standards worked best. Panel members endorsed wide range
of technologies, from CDMA (Bell Atlantic consortium) and TDMA (AT&T) digital
standards to analog technologies at 1.8 GHz, as Jerry Waylan, [executive vice president]
o " GTE Personal Communications Services, suggested.").
68. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992);
Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-44 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985). Whether this is true in a given case depends on the facts. A
customer's need to buy a new SMR terminal for $1000 might chill interchangeability to a
significant degree, but the need for a new fifty-dollar pager would cause barely a sneeze.
It might be argued that carriers can minimize this by offering to buy back a customer's old
terminal or discount a new one, or by compensating a new customer for contractual
penalties incurred in termination of an existing carrier. However, this merely passes the
chilling effect on competition from the customer to the carrier in the short term. In the long
term, the carrier will recover the added cost from the customer.
69. A Commission's rule making can reflect massive factual and theoretical evidence
about competition that the parties submitted to it in that proceeding. For example, in the
CMRS Third Report and Order, the Commission analyzed, in order to make certain
regulatory classifications, whether various mobile radio services were "substantially similar"
to each other. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 22-79. Such evidence,
as a practical matter, will not be gathered in an adjudicatory merger proceeding before the
Commission. In a merger proceeding, however, the Commission may use evidence and
findings from a prior rule making in defining product and geographic markets. See, e.g.,
Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, para. 148 & n.35 (1994),
following In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para.
13, at 562-63 (1983) (finding a single nationwide market for all interexchange services),
rev'd on other grounds, AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); In re IDB
Communications Group, Inc. and Southwest Communications, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
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concerns a specific locality or localities, however, and defining a product
market may require analysis of local peculiarities. For example, the product
market in a merger of one mobile telephone service company with another
may be just mobile telephone service. If, however, one of the companies
also provides paging service to the same area, the product market also may
include paging service. Satellite systems may be in the product market in
a rural area, and maritime services also may be included in an area that
includes a heavily used harbor or river. The point is simply that the facts
of each merger need individual examination to lead to a valid product
market for an analysis of its competitive effects.
a. Precedent
Past FCC decisions offer little guidance about product markets in
mobile services mergers, principally because these decisions date from a
time when each mobile service was largely a self-contained oligopoly, and
regulatory barriers were still in effect between cellular, SMR, and paging
services.7' This made for seemingly minimal competition between and
among different mobile services. The parties to merger litigation before the
Commission also seem not to have briefed often the issue of product
markets.7
Recent decisions of the Commission's Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau (WTB), however, show increasing attention to this issue and
progressive refinement in findings. In a ruling concerning a merger of
SMRs, the WTB first found a product market of all CMRS, a broad
regulatory category consisting of almost all the mobile radio services
described in the preceding subsection.7' In two later decisions, which
concerned other mergers of SMRs, the WTB refined its analysis and found
a product market of all cellular, paging, SMR-both interconnected and
noninterconnected to the PSTN-services, broadband and narrowband PCS,
and Business Radio-a form of private mobile radio system-that is
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 1110, para. 28 n.53, at 1115 (1994), following In re Int'l
Competitive Carrier Policies, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, para. 36, at 829
(1985), reconsideration denied, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1435 (1986) (finding two primary
international product markets and route-by-route geographic markets).
70. See infra notes 91-93.
71. In the only reported court decision applying § 7 of the Clayton Act to a merger of
mobile service companies, there was no dispute about the product market. McCaw Personal
Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
72. Nextel Communications, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3361 (1995). For a full
definition of CMRS, see supra note 28.
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interconnected to the PSTN . 3 The WTB excluded maritime, air-ground,
and satellite systems from the product market and reserved judgment about
whether unlicensed PCS belonged in it.74
The Department of Justice (DOJ), in recent analyses of mobile
services mergers, has defined much narrower markets. In reviewing the
acquisition of McCaw Cellular Communications by AT&T, it posited a
product market consisting of only cellular service.7 In reviewing a
merger of two SMRs, it posited a product market of "trunked" SMRs at
220, 800, and 900 MHz.76 In neither case did the DOJ include either
paging service or PCS in the same product market with cellular or SMR
service. All of these decisions by the DOJ resulted in consent decrees. So
far, none has been litigated or affirmed by a court.
The relatively narrow definitions posited by the DOJ can be attributed
to several factors. One factor tending to separate cellular service and SMR
service is the failure of their providers to compete directly with each other
and the fact that a customer switching to an SMR needs to buy a new
terminal, which may cost up to $1000. The relatively low price and
functionality of paging service, and the current unavailability of PCS,
coupled with the Horizontal Guidelines' strict standards for including
"supply substitutes" and new entrants in product markets (discussed below)
account for the DOJ's exclusion of those services from the product
markets.
b. Possible Product Markets
The regulatory classification of CMRS is a malleable lump of clay
with which to start shaping a generic product market for mobile services
mergers. However, significant additions, deletions, and alterations may be
73. In re Applications of Dial Page, Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of Dial Call,
Inc. SMR and Business Licenses to Nextel Comm., Inc., Order, File No. 907075, DA 95-
2379, paras. 21, 24 (Nov. 22, 1995); Motorola, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783, paras. 17-
18, at 7785-86 (1995).
74. In the only other recent decision speaking to this issue, Craig 0. McCaw,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, paras. 16-17, at 5848 (1994), the
Commission found a relevant product market consisting only of cellular service.
75. United States v. AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,166 (D.D.C. 1994) (distinguishing
cellular service from wireline service on ground of mobility and noting that "[wlith
extremely limited exceptions, there are no providers of mobile telephone services other than
the two cellular carriers").
76. United States v. Motorola, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 55,708, at 55,709 (Dep't of Justice-
Antitrust Div. 1994) (competitive impact statement). "Trunking" is an efficient way to use
spectrum, see CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 35.
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necessary.' Services that are classified as "private," and, therefore, are
not CMRS for regulatory purposes, may be in competition with CMRS
services.78 Furthermore, while CB radio and unlicensed PCS are not
CMRS because they do not require a FCC license,79 and under the
Communications Act only licensed services may be CMRS, their functional
similarity to cellular service-providing local two-way voice communica-
tions-may place them in the same product market. Finally, federal
government systems and POTS are not CMRS, but they may compete with
services that are CMRS.
Several approaches to defining product markets in mobile services
mergers merit consideration. Certainly, each mobile service provided by
one of the merging companies belongs in a product market. As to each
service, one could ask whether it is reasonably interchangeable with
another service described in the preceding subsection. Alternatively, one
could ask the Five Percent Question about the merging company's
particular service and the other aforementioned services.
The answers to these questions might lead to several different product
markets. At the narrow extreme are the recent decisions of the DOJ,
finding service-specific markets, such as only cellular service or only
trunked SMR service, at certain frequencies.8' Second, a more functional
analysis of mobile services might result in a finding of three major product
markets: telephone service, dispatch, and paging.' The "telephone
service" market would consist of cellular, a portion of interconnected
SMRs' usage, and perhaps broadband PCS. Satellite, air-ground, maritime,
unlicensed PCS, and private, federal government, and low-end systems
would probably be considered separate "niche" markets, or a submarket of
77. See CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 14 (the Commission noting
that its decision that certain services are substantially similar "furthers our policy objective
of ensuring a level regulatory playing field for CMRS. We note, however, that an analysis
performed in the context of a different set of policy goals, or application of the same policy
goals to different circumstances, may result in different conclusions regarding the extent of
competition."). See also id. paras. 42, 47, at 8011-12, 8014.
78. Antitrust analysis by courts recognizes that for some users of a product, self-
manufacture is a competitive alternative to buying from an outside supplier. See FTC v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 31, 42-3, 50-1 (D.D.C. 1988) ("Interplant transfers
are relevant to antitrust review since INTERNALLY consumed products must sometimes
be considered in the market along with products sold externally.") (capitalization in
original). Self-manufacture is comparable to buying a private radio communications system
instead of subscribing to a service from a common carrier.
79. CMRS Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 37.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 153(n)(3) (1989 & Supp. 1995).
81. See supra notes 75-76.
82. See Motorola, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783, para. 18 & n.51, at 7786 (1995);
Nextel Communications, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3361, para. 31 & n.104 (1995).
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the telephone service market with little or no influence over the market's
"Big Three"-cellular service, interconnected SMR service and broadband
PCS. The "dispatch" market would consist of some portion of interconnect-
ed SMRs, all noninterconnected SMRs, perhaps some broadband PCS,
private systems, and federal government systems. The "paging" market
would consist of existing paging services, narrowband PCS, and perhaps
some part of private and federal government systems. 3
A third possible vision would emphasize power in the marketplace as
measured by revenues, making cellular service by far the most significant
service. According to this view, cellular has power over and, therefore, is
in the same product market with other services, such as SMR, paging,
PCS, and private systems. Collectively, however, the other services might
exert some constraint over cellular, just as many Lilliputians, working
together, subdued Gulliver.' Under such a vision, cellular service would
be found in the product market of every merger, but in a merger of cellular
companies the product market might consist of only cellular service.
Finally, a relatively loose application of the reasonable interchange-
ability test might lead to the formulation of a single product market,
perhaps called "services for people on the move,"' consisting of all the
services described earlier.
Evidence exists to support multiservice product markets. The
Commission has found that many mobile services now compete with each
other or are expected to do so soon. 6 Furthermore, the Commission has
found that convergence among previously distinct services is growing.'
83. This functional approach-for example, grouping together all two-way voice servic-
es-is consistent with the Horizontal Guidelines, which start with a basic or core product
and then look at the "next best substitute." Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.11,
at 20,572.
84. See id. (defining product market by reference to a basic or core product and
alternatives to it that, "in the aggregate," would make a price increase for the product
unprofitable).
85. See CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 58, where the Commission
stated that "[tlhe common characteristic of mobile services customers is their need to
communicate electronically on a real-time basis (or virtually real-time basis) while they are
'on the move.'"
86. See CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 67. The Commission has also
found that maritime service providers compete with each other and with cellular service.
87. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 56-57, 61-62, 74-75, 77, 261-
62. See also id., paras. 57-68; Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 24, 1994, at4, 4 (Personal
Communications Industry Association (PCIA) and National Association of Business and
Educational Radio (NABER) are considering merging because, according to the Chairman
of NABER, "the traditional lines of private and common carrier distinctions no longer
exist."); Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 7, 1994, at 4, 4 (PCIA and NABER announce
merger plans.); Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 22, 1994, at 8, 8-9 (Cellular Telecommu-
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Technology is making possible "one stop shopping" for both paging and
talking, and for talking within discrete groups and with the rest of the
world. 8 Paging devices are starting to feature two-way capabilities, to
deliver written messages, similar to short telephone calls on cellular
systems and SMRs,19 and even to deliver short simulated-voice messages.
Such capabilities make paging resemble a two-way voice service and are
expected to proliferate in the next year.90
The Commission favors such convergence. 9' It is systematically
removing regulatory barriers to convergence, and no longer erects them in
the first place when it creates new services (e.g., PCS). Thus, today's
cellular carriers are allowed to provide paging and dispatch service on their
cellular frequencies,' and dispatch systems may provide paging and
telephone service.93
However, care in finding multiservice product markets is prudent. Just
as one swallow does not make a spring, the first paging terminal with voice
nications Industry Association is soliciting membership among potential PCS companies,
including providers of long-distance and cable television services, summoning "all those
working together to build the wireless future."); Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 23, 1994,
at 6, 6 (Board of PCIA approves merger with NABER.).
88. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Some new digital mobile telephones
include pagers. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 75.
89. See supra pp. 257-260. Paging units now have the capabilities to store and recall
messages, display full-text messages, and deliver voice messages. See, e.g., Comm. Daily
Notebook, COMM. DAILY, July 21, 1995, at 8, 8 (PCS demonstration features telephone call
and alphanumeric paging via one handset.); Telephony, COMM. DAILY, July 18, 1995, at
8, 8 (announcement of market test of two-way paging); SALOMON BROS., THE WIRELESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEw 20 (1994).
90. Dave Kansas, PageNet Officials Send Mixed Signals With Stock Sales, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 29, 1995, at Cl, C15 (A PageNet product scheduled for release in early 1996
"would permit callers to leave not only a phone number in the pager, but also a voice
message."); Naik, supra note 50, at B1, B7 ("Mobile Telecommunications Technology,
Inc., of Jackson, Miss., plans to roll out inexpensive two-way paging services in 300
markets in the second half of this year, allowing users to send brief messages from one
beeper to another.").
91. The Commission has stated that "all CMRS providers should have the potential to
utilize any CMRS spectrum in a manner that can adapt the nature of the service they
provide to meet specific customer needs .... [E]ven if CMRS providers offer differing
services today, if consumers desire particular services or combinations of services in the
future, a variety of CMRS providers should have the opportunity to use different
technological configurations to meet this customer demand in competition with other CMRS
carriers." CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 69.
92. In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's Rules to Permit
Liberalization of Technology and Auxiliary Service Offerings in the Domestic Public
Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service, Report and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 7033, para.
77, at 7043 (1988). The only limitation on such paging service is that it not interfere with
the cellular service. In practical effect, this is an insignificant limitation.
93. Motorola, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783, paras. 17-20 (1995).
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capability does not place paging and mobile telephone service in the same
product market. A convincing amount of factual evidence is needed. The
facts need careful analysis to distinguish between services that compete with
each other and, therefore, belong in the same product market and services
that merely complement each other and, thus, ought to remain in separate
product markets. 4
1. PCS, Uncommitted Entry, and Supply Substitution
The Commission created PCS with the express goal of becoming
"competitive with existing services such as cellular, SMR, and others. " '
PCS is widely expected to take the form of specific services that are
functionally equivalent with, and priced no higher than, existing mobile
telephone, dispatch, and paging services. If broadband PCS is as multifac-
eted as predicted, it may eventually blur the distinctions between mobile
telephone, dispatch, and paging and may create enough new applications
that there will indeed be a single product market of services for "people on
the move."
Whether PCS belongs in the product market in a mobile services
94. For example, if customers make an "either/or" decision between paging and
cellular, that would support putting the two services in the same product market. But if the
two services meet related but different needs of the same customers, as for example clothes-
washing detergent and bleach, that would support putting them in different product markets.
See generally FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1967) (holding liquid
packaged detergents and bleach are in different product markets). Cellular and paging
services can be said to compete for consumers' "mobile communications dollars" in the
same sense that detergent and bleach compete for consumers' "clothes cleaning dollars."
But this broad of an approach, if taken to its logical conclusion, would determine that every
product in the world competes with every other product for "the consumer's dollar." Such
analysis is too sweeping to be useful for defining product markets and may be avoided by
the Five Percent Question.
Some people use several mobile services simultaneously. As noted above, over 30%
of cellular subscribers also subscribe to paging service and many businesses use a
combination of common carrier services and private systems. See supra p. 258. Taxi
drivers and police often have cellular service, dispatch service and a CB radio in their
vehicles. These facts, however, may not show competition among the services. Perhaps the
services are merely complimentary to each other, as in the case of clothes-washing detergent
and bleach, meeting related but different needs. The same question will likely be posed
about mobile services and POTS. The first widespread use of mobile services in the home,
for example, may be for uses that POTS does not now perform, such as baby monitoring,
instead of as a direct substitute for existing POTS uses. See CS FIRST BOSTON, PCS: A
CRITICAL PIECE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS PUZZLE 20-21 (1995). It is unclear, without
more, whether mobile services and POTS will be competitors or mere complements for
each other.
95. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 7700, para. 31, at 7715
(1993).
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merger is a potentially contentious issue. The question whether existing
services like cellular and SMR belong in the same product market focuses
on functions or price-elasticities, whereas the question about PCS focuses
on time. As of the time of publication, broadband PCS is available only in
the Baltimore-Washington area. Narrowband PCS is available in only a few
regions and localities, and while the frequencies for unlicensed PCS are
available, they do not appear to be in much use. Widespread availability of
broadband and narrowband PCS, even in large cities, is not expected until
late 1996 or into 1997.96
There is evidence, however, that the inevitability of broadband PCS
is having a significant impact on existing services. For example, cellular
prices are declining; features and functions are increasing; and cellular
carriers are offering options that resemble the expected form of broadband
PCS. 9 These trends are probably attributable to the cellular carriers'
knowledge that soon they will face several new competitors in the form of
several broadband PCS licensees.9"
These facts may satisfy the legal standards for including PCS in the
product market for a current mobile services merger. Under the reasonable
interchangeability standard, product markets may include companies or
96. State Activities, COMM. DAILY, June 9, 1995, at 7, 7 (The first broadband PCS
service, provided by the winner of an early "pioneer" license from the Commission, began
service in the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. area in late 1995.); Telephony, COMM. DAILY,
June 7, 1995, at 8, 9 ("PCS PrimeCo alliance of 3 RIHCs and AirTouch. . . said suppliers
must meet PrimeCo deadline of providing service by end of next year.").
97. See Naik, supra note 50, at B1, B7 ("GTE... already offers rudimentary follow-
me service to residential customers on a combination of local telephone and cellular
networks. Its Tele-Go service is now used by more than 120,000 subscribers in 15 cities.
Customers pay up to $25 a month for unlimited use of a small cordless phone at home and
a per-minute fee of 20C to 30C for calls made while traveling with the device."); Mike
Mills, Wireless: The Next Generation, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1995, 1, 14-15; Telephony,
COMM. DAILY, Mar. 9, 1995, at 8, 8 (NYNEX cellular company "said it will begin
offering PCS-type services in metro N.Y. under Geographic Option Plan trademark, giving
customers greater flexibility in setting rates and using service. Monthly charge is $24.99,
with additional min. at 29 cents in home county, 99 cents elsewhere."); Mary E. Thyfault,
Bell Companies Get Personal-Bell Atlantic, NYNEX Plan to Merge Their Mobile and
Cellular Divisions as PCS Players Continue Consolidation, INFORMATIONWEEK, July 18,
1994, at 33 (Bell Atlantic announces a low-priced, low-range offering on its Annapolis,
Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh cellular systems, intended to resemble what PCS offerings will
be like.).
98. Cisco Pres. Sees Fundamental Shift in Telecommunication in Next 5 Years, COMM.
DAILY, Mar. 21, 1995, at 1, 1-2 ("Northern Telecom [director]-cellular product marketing,
said pressure from PCS industry is forcing cellular industry to pay more attention to
customers and less to technology."). See also CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd.
paras. 23-24. But see FCC Plans Monthly Sales for IVDS, SMR, MMDS and 10-MHz PCS
Spectrum, supra note 50, at 2 ("Bell Atlantic/Nynex Cellular [Vice-President] Gary
Schulman ... said cellular prices were coming down regardless of new entrants.").
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services that will soon be in competition with those that are in the product
market now. The case law uses the term "supply substitution" to describe
the ability of a company that does not now provide a service, but could by
retooling its production facilities and could start to provide the service with
reasonable promptness and at modest cost. 99 Such companies may be
included in the product market with companies that provide the service
now.
The Horizontal Guidelines describe the same general idea by the term
"uncommitted entrant' and apply stricter standards than existing case
law for the speed and ease with which the new company must start
providing the service. The Horizontal Guidelines define an uncommitted
entrant as a company that would-not just could-enter the product market
without incurring significant sunk costs' 0 ' within one year of a small but
significant and nontransitory price increase. The company also must be able
to exit the market just as easily. In other words, the company must be
uncommitted to the market."° The Horizontal Guidelines also appear to
include in the relevant market "firms which have committed to entering the
market prior to the merger."
0 3
Broadband and narrowband PCS may now satisfy these standards, or
at least the principles underlying them. While starting to provide those
99. SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1995) and cases cited
supra note 6; Rothery Storage and Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980); FTC v. Elders
Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989). Cf. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18,
§ 1.321, paras. 20,573-74 n. 14 ("If production substitution among a group of products is
nearly universal among the firms selling one or more of those products, . . . [the
Department of Justice] may use an aggregate description of those markets as a matter of
convenience.").
A typical period is two years. See FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 37
& n.23 (concerning "the extensive present and future intermaterial competition in the glass
and other packaging industries, . . . [a]n important, but undisputed, assumption of the
economic analysis in this case is that the relevant time frame within which to view elasticity
is approximately two years. In other words, conversions by purchasers between types of
containers must be feasible within this time frame for demand and supply to be considered
elastic.").
100. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.0, para. 20,572; § 1.32, paras. 20,573-3
to -4.
101. Sunk costs are, generally, costs that cannot be recovered, such as capital spending
for unique equipment and expenses such as advertising. See also CARLTON & PERLOFF,
supra note 9, at 925.
102. Id.
103. See Horizontal Guidelines, § 3.2, paras. 20,573-10 n.27. It is unclear whether the
words "prior to the merger" refer to the time of entry or to the time of commitment. The
difference could be significant in the case of broadband PCS, whose future providers are
now committed to entering the mobile services market, but will not enter it for a year on
a significant scale.
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services is by no means fast or inexpensive, companies have already
incurred billions of dollars of sunk expense for them"° and have commit-
ted billions more. There is no doubt that broadband and narrowband PCS
will be provided on a significant scale by 1997, even without an increase
in the price of existing mobile services. It requires only a sensible
extension of the principles of supply substitution and uncommitted entry to
apply them to companies that are firmly committed to entering a market,
despite expense and other barriers. The effect that broadband PCS is having
on cellular prices and quality adds factual support to this proposition. It
follows, as in the ordinary case of supply substitution and uncommitted
entry, that broadband and narrowband PCS have overcome obstacles to
entry and that the effect of broadband PCS on competition is felt.
Therefore, broadband and narrowband PCS may belong in a relevant
market for mobile services in a current merger. 105
c. A Note about Evidence
In applying either the reasonable interchangeability test or the Five
Percent Question, 06 facts about customers' behavior are generally the
most probative evidence. 7 Since the process of market definition is fact-
intensive, counsel in any case where the product market is likely to be a
disputed issue should present factual evidence in support of asserted
product market definitions. Commission findings in past rule makings may
not constitute such evidence. Those findings also may be out-of-date or
may omit the unique attributes of the companies and areas involved in a
particular merger.
Records of an increase or decrease in the number of customers or of
what actually happened when a price change occurred would be most
probative. For example, a party claiming that cellular and interconnected
SMR services are in the same product market could produce records of a
cellular company showing that it, to a significant degree, won or lost
104. FCC Auction for PCS Licenses Ends with Proceeds Topping $7 Billion, COMM.
DAILY, Mar. 14, 1995, at 1.
105. Future competitors who do not pass either the case law or the Horizontal
Guidelines' test for supply substitution may be considered later in the analysis of a merger,
under the term "Ease of Entry." See infra at 297-99.
106. For evidence that is acceptable under the Horizontal Guidelines, see Horizontal
Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.11, paras. 20,572-73.
107. FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27,35 (D.D.C. 1988), citing United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, passim (1964). For an analysis of evidence
to define product markets, see Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp.
1146, 1155-65 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
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customers to interconnected SMRs.108 Less probative, but still useful,
would be the results of a survey that asked existing customers the Five
Percent Question: What would you do if all providers of your service
raised prices by 5 percent? Still less probative evidence could be ex-
pert-factual and theoretical-and anecdotal testimony."°
d. Conclusion
At the end of the analysis outlined above, at least one product market
consisting of one or more mobile services, and perhaps some POTS, has
been defined. Product market analysis is laborious in part because it is
often the single decisive issue in merger cases. Once it is finished,
however, the definitional task then changes focus, from function and price-
elasticity to the geographic areas within which the services in the product
market compete.
B. The Geographic Market
1. Generally
In each merger, the geographic market also needs defining. As with
product markets, a merger may involve more than one geographic market.
A geographic market is the area of effective competition-the area in which
buyers can practically turn for alternative sources of supply or in which
there are sellers who could act to restrain the prices charged to those
buyers." 0 In the United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,I' the Supreme
108. Similarly probative evidence from the cellular company's regularly kept business
records would be its documents about planning, marketing, or sales showing that the
company considered interconnected SMRs to be a serious source of competition.
Conversely, the absence of any mention of SMRs in a cellular company's files might be
evidence that the cellular company did not consider itself to be competing with SMRs.
109. Examples of anecdotal evidence about whether two services are in the same product
market could consist of advertisements for both of them appearing in the same narrowly
focused trade journals; comparative advertising by providers of one of the services; the
presence of providers of both services at the same trade shows or gatherings of customers;
and articles, speeches, and customer declarations that were not prepared in anticipation of
litigation.
110. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963), followed in
Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991); Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); In re Common Carrier
Services, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, para. 25 (1983), vacated on other
grounds, AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
111. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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Court stated that the most important criterion is the geographic structure of
supplier-customer relations."' "[T]he area of effective competition in the
known line of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market
area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practica-
bly turn for supplies.""'
The Horizontal Guidelines define a geographic market similarly: "a
region such that a hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or
future producer of the relevant product at locations in that region would
profitably impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory'
increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for all products
produced elsewhere." 1 4 Thus, as with product markets, the judicial
definitions of geographic markets are multifaceted and subjective, and the
Horizontal Guidelines focus exclusively on price and pose a hypothetical
question for which direct evidence is scarce.
2. Mobile Service Coverage
Both the case law and the Horizontal Guidelines' definitions focus on
the area to which buyers can practically turn for alternative sources of
supply. In the case of manufacturing, this area may be worldwide. Most
mobile services, however, are manufactured close to where the customer
uses them; typically at a radio tower within a few miles of the customer.
For example, a customer wanting cellular service in Philadelphia can only
receive service from providers in Philadelphia. That customer cannot go to
Chicago or Asia, obtain service there, and then bring it back to Philadel-
112. Id. at 357-59; accord Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37
(1962). With respect to the manufacture of shoes, the Supreme Court found in Brown Shoe
that the relevant geographic market was the entire nation: "The relationships of product
value, bulk, weight and consumer demand enable manufacturers to distribute their shoes on
a nationwide basis, as [the parties to the merger], in fact, do. The anti-competitive effects
of the merger are to be measured within this range of distribution." Id. at 328. However,
with respect to the retail sale of shoes, the Supreme Court defined smaller relevant
geographic markets, as:
those cities with a population exceeding 10,000 and their environs in which
both [parties to the merger] retailed shoes through their own outlets. Such
markets are large enough to include the downtown shops and suburban
shopping centers in areas contiguous to the city, which are the important
competitive factors, and yet are small enough to exclude stores beyond the
immediate environs of the city, which are of little competitive significance.
Id. at 339.
113. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 359 (emphasis and citation omitted).
114. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.21, at 20,573. As with product markets,
the Horizontal Guidelines define a relevant geographic market differently if the producer
could profitably practice price discrimination within it. If sellers could profitably
discriminate against buyers in a particular area within the geographic market, the Horizontal
Guidelines may treat that area as a separate geographic market. Id. § 1.22, at 20,573-3.
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phia. Therefore, geographic markets.in mobile services mergers are likely
to consist of one or more coverage area(s) of the systems providing
services in the product market. A brief summary of the great variances
between major service coverage follows.
a. Cellular
The Commission initially licensed cellular systems in 734 Metropoli-
tan or Rural Statistical Areas, each of which was specified by the
Commission. In most areas, the two cellular carriers have built towers to
provide coverage over the identical Commission licensed territory. Many
licensees in neighboring markets have combined their systems, thus,
creating single systems with metropolitan coverage. One cellular system,
for example, covers the greater Philadelphia area-Philadelphia, Allentown,
and Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey; and
Wilmington, Delaware."'
b. SMRs
Traditionally, a SMR's coverage was a twenty- to thirty-mile radius
around each SMR tower, and the tower's location was chosen by the SMR.
As a result, original SMR coverage areas, unlike cellular ones, were small
and often partially overlapped. Now, however, many SMRs are consolidat-
ing into a few national chains, which will offer local, regional, and even
national coverage; a few local systems are likely to remain as niche
competitors in most markets." 6
c. Paging
The coverage of a paging system may be local, metropolitan,
115. Originally, all cellular customers received access to their entire "home" system as
part of their service. Some carriers offered broader coverage as an option, such as
McCaw's "City of Florida," which offered calling at discounted rates between any of
McCaw's cellular systems in Florida. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 17
n.26; Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, para. 23 n.55
(1994); R. HARRIS & D. RUBINFELD, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY AND THE
LAW & ECONOMICS CONSULTING GROUP, INC., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TOMCOM-
PRIMECO: THE AIRTOUCH-US WEST/BELL ATLANTIC-NYNEX JOINT VENTuRE IN
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONs4 n.1 (1994). Recently, however, some cellular carriers have
begun to offer the option of service within a relatively small part of a system's total
coverage for a relatively low rate. See sources cited supra note 98.
116. The Commission is considering changing its SMR licensing rules to approximate
the cellular service's area-by-area licensing, in order to facilitate the consolidation of small
SMRs into wide-area ones. In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to
Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 3950 (1993).
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regional, or national depending on the license that the Commission has
issued and the mergers that licensees have affected. Wide-area coverage is
growing in popularity."7
d. PCS
Broadband PCS blocks A and B will be licensed for forty-seven
territories, some of which are almost the size of Texas, and the other four
blocks will be licensed for 493 areas that are somewhat larger than the
original cellular territories. Coverage will probably start in central cities
and grow outward, which is what happened in the early years of cellular
service. Of the narrowband PCS licenses, ten will be national, thirty will
be regional, and more than 3500 will be for smaller areas. Unlicensed PCS
will have very small coverage, similar to CB radios and cordless tele-
phones. 118
e. Other
Air-ground and satellite systems have national coverage. Each public
coast maritime station has coverage within approximately twenty-five
nautical miles of each tower." 9 A typical CB radio or a walkie-talkie has
coverage of no more than a few miles. Private and federal government
systems are a mixture of local, regional, and national coverage.
f Contradictory Trends
There are several contradictory trends in coverage of mobile services.
As existing carriers merge, wide-area licenses for PCS are issued, and
satellite systems go into service, larger coverage becomes possible. This
coverage is often offered to customers. At the same time and in evident
anticipation of broadband PCS, cellular carriers are offering customers the
option of smaller coverage for smaller charges. Finally, mobile services
increasingly will be provided by large, centralized corporations, each of
whose systems has the same or similar quality, pricing, features, and "look
and feel."
3. Precedent
The decisions of the Commission and the DOJ concerning geographic
117. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 54.
118. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras. 46, 49-50.
119. In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning Maritime Communica-
tions, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 7863, para. 34
(1992).
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markets show more consistency than those concerning product markets. In
considering the merger of a cellular service company, McCaw, and AT&T,
the Commission and the DOJ used the cellular service areas ordained by
the Commission as geographic markets."2° In its recent decision approv-
ing the merger of the two cellular carriers, the Commission's Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau used as its geographic markets "the areas in
which [either of the merging companies] provides cellular service."1 21
The DOJ posited the geographic market in recent SMR mergers to be "the
license areas in which the FCC has authorized the provision of SMR
service" and "[i]n any particular city... the twenty-five mile radius from
city center . .. ", The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, in its
review of the same SMR mergers, accepted the DOJ's position for the sake
of argument without approving it."
4. Possible Geographic Markets
The starting point for defining a geographic market in a mobile
services merger is the coverage area of each system which provides a
service that is within the product market and that is operated by one of the
merging companies. Each such area might be expanded to include the areas
for which the merging company is licensed but is not yet serving."
Moreover, each area might be further expanded to include the coverage of
other services that are in the product market and that have larger geograph-
ic coverage. However, where expanded coverage is only used by a small
proportion of the customers within the merging company's area, there may
120. Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 11 (finding the geographic markets to be
.each Metropolitan Statistical Area ('MSA') or Rural Statistical Area ('RSA') in which
McCaw offers such service"), aft'd, SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1485 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (finding "the market is local because 'the purchaser cannot, as a practical matter,
turn to suppliers outside their own areas'.") (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949)); United States v. AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,167 (FCC
1994) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1994)) (finding the relevant geographic markets to be
"those service areas in which the FCC has licensed cellular carriers to provide cellular
service"). In most cases, McCaw had built facilities to service its entire FCC-licensed area,
so that there was no real difference between its actual coverage and its FCC-licensed
coverage. See supra note 69.
121. BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, para. 18 (1995), application for
review pending.
122. United States v. Motorola, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 55,709 (Dep't of Justice-Antitrust
Div. 1994).
123. Nextel Communications, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3361 (1995), reconsideration
denied by Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 10450 (1995), Motorola, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783,
para. 29 (1995), petition for reconsideration pending.
124. It appears that in the cases discussed above there was no significant difference
between the served area and the licensed area.
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be no justification for expanding the geographic market.
As a final alternative, there is case law finding that the geographic
market is nationwide when a service, even a local one, is provided by
centrally managed companies that plan and operate on a national basis."Z
Certainly, the trend in wireless service is towards regional and national
chains under central management," but that is still the exception rather
than the rule and is likely to remain so for several years.
Current proclamations of an emerging "national market for mobile
services," in the sense that the term "market" is used in competitive
analysis, are inaccurate. For example, it is frequently said that mobile
customers now demand "seamless nationwide service."127 However, a
recent WTB decision found that such talk does not imply a regional or
nationwide market. Rather, it means one of two things. First, customers
may want roaming,"2 which existed from the conception of cellular
service. 2 A second possibility is that some customers prefer a product
that has a nationally recognized brand name, but that is produced and
consumed in each local community. For example, a given cellular carrier's
mobile service may seem larger than another carrier's because it has a
brand name-Cellular One, for example-that is recognized by many
communities all over the country. In each of those communities, however,
the customer may choose from among the only two companies that offer
cellular service. In such a case, the geographic market ultimately remains
that community. 3 ' Thus, the geographic market in a mobile service
125. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966).
126. Each Bell cellular company covers most or all major metropolitan areas in the
"home" region of its affiliated telephone companies. SMR mergers began a few years ago,
grouping previously balkanized systems into regional clusters that Nextel, in turn, is now
merging into national coverage. The broadband PCS auctions have so far resulted in two
Bell companies-BellSouth and Southwestern Bell-filling holes in their regional cellular
coverage. Three winners of the broadband PCS auctions will approach national coverage
when their cellular and broadband PCS coverages are combined. They are AT&T,
Wirelessco (consisting of Sprint and three cable television operators), and PCS Primeco
(consisting of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, AirTouch, and US West).
127. See, e.g., Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836,
para. 33 (1994); HARRIS & RUBINFELD, supra note 115, at 17 & n.12.
128. Roaming is what happens "when the subscriber of one CMRS provider enters the
service area of another with whom the subscriber has no pre-existing service or financial
relationship, and attempts either to continue an in-progress call, to receive an in-coming call
or to place an out-going call." In re Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd.
10,666, para. 45 (1995).
129. In re Land Mobile Service Use of 806-960 MHz Band, Second Report and Order,
46 F.C.C.2d 752, para. 21 (1974) (advocating "[nationwide] compatibility. All systems
shall be designed for nationwide compatibility for roamer operation." Id. app. C, § IV(f).).
130. See BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, paras. 19-21 (1995).
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merger is likely to be each merging company's coverage area or its larger
licensed territory, until a regional or national market emerges.
After the geographic market for a merger has been defined, the
definitions of both the product market and the geographic market are
combined into a statement of the "relevant" market for purposes of
analyzing the competitive effects of the merger, such as mobile telephone
service in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
C. Horizontal, Vertical, or Conglomerate?
The final definitional question about a merger asks whether the
merger is horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, or a combination. The answer
to this question will influence the depth of scrutiny given to the merger's
competitive effects because each type of merger is generally believed to
pose a different amount of risk to competition. Thankfully, after the rigors
of defining product and geographic markets, classifying a merger as
horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate should be self-evident simply from
looking at the names given to the product markets. The three categories of
mergers are not mutually exclusive. A single merger may be horizontal in
some respects and vertical in others, or it may combine aspects of the three
categories in some other way." 1
A horizontal merger is "between companies performing similar
functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services."'
For example, a merger of two cellular companies is a horizontal merger.
If a cellular company and a paging company merge, and both those
services are in the same product market, then it is also a horizontal merger.
Horizontal mergers are thought to have the greatest potential anticompet-
itive effects because they are most likely to eliminate a competitor from the
relevant market.
A vertical merger is "the acquisition of one company which buys the
product sold by the acquiring company or which sells the product bought
by the acquiring company.""' An example of a vertical merger is when
131. For example, the AT&T-McCaw merger was horizontal in that both companies
provided interstate interexchange service; vertical in the sense that AT&T manufactured
cellular networks for sale to McCaw; and conglomerate in that McCaw owned some
interests in broadcasting, which was a business with no close relationship to AT&T's lines
of business. See Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836
(1994).
132. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962).
133. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Conn.
1969). In such vertical premerger relationships, the selling company is referred to as the
.upstream" company or the "input supplier," and the buying company is referred to as the
"downstream" company or the "output supplier."
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a company that provides cellular service merges with a company that
manufactures equipment used in providing cellular service. The McCaw-
AT&T merger was such an example. In vertical mergers, anticompetitive
impact is usually less than in horizontal mergers because the parties are not
competitors.
A conglomerate merger is neither horizontal nor vertical. 1 A
merger of a cellular service company and a manufacturer of dog food is an
example. Conglomerate mergers usually pose no significant potential
anticompetitive effects and, accordingly, this Article will give them
minimal attention. 35
II. THE MERITS OF THE MERGER
In each relevant market, the competitive effects of the merger must
be predicted, and the resulting balance between pro- and anti-competitive
effects must be determined to see whether the merger will, on the whole,
increase, decrease, or have no net effect on competition.'36 Because
horizontal mergers are thought to pose the greatest risk of anticompetitive
effects, they are discussed first and in greatest detail.
A. Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
For horizontal mergers, the analytical task can be broken into two
parts. 137 First, compare the relevant market's degree of concentration,
defined as the amount of power held by a small number of companies,
before and after the merger. Second, examine the possibilities for
increasing or decreasing certain specific kinds of competitive activity. The
first part is commonly done by objective measurements. The second
requires a more individualized analysis of conditions in the relevant market
134. Id.
135. Conglomerate mergers are thought to pose no danger to competition because the
merging companies are not competitors, so their merger will not aggravate any market
power that either of them has, absent exceptional circumstances. The most common
exceptional circumstance is that industry conditions will change, placing the companies'
products in competition with each other or making one merging company's product an input
of the other's. Absent such a prospect, even if the merged company has market power over
one product, the lack of relationship between the two products will give the merged
company no leverage to make its customers buy its other product.
136. No relevant market can be ignored. For a case where the Commission was overly
concerned with one product market (cellular) and ignored another (paging), leading to its
reversal by the Court of Appeals, see Celcom Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 789 F.2d 67, 71
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aft'd, 839 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
137. If the parties to the merger provide the same product in different geographic
markets, this analytical step may be skipped. The merger should be analyzed as a
geographic extension merger. See infra at p. 300-301.
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and the capabilities and incentives of the competitors in it."13
1. Initial Analysis by Objective Measurements
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank139 that
"a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percent-
age share of the relevant market, and results in a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects."140
An accepted objective measurement of any increase in concentration in the
relevant market is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). To calculate the
HIl, the "market share" of each competitor in the premerger relevant
market is calculated and squared; and then, the squares are summed. The
same calculations also are made for the post-merger market. The only
change from the premerger market will be the larger market share of the
merged company. The difference between the pre- and post-merger sums
is an objective estimate of any resultant change in market concentration.
The Horizontal Guidelines provide that a post-merger HHI of under
1000 points reveals an unconcentrated market. In an unconcentrated
market, a merger is unlikely to decrease competition and ordinarily needs
no further analysis. A post-merger H1 of between 1000 and 1800 points
reveals a moderately concentrated market. In a moderately concentrated
market, a merger increasing the HI by less than 100 points is unlikely to
decrease competition and ordinarily needs no further analysis, but a merger
increasing the HI by 100 or more points may decrease competition and
needs further analysis. A post-merger HHI of over 1800 points reveals a
highly concentrated market. In a highly concentrated market, a merger
increasing the HII1 by less than 50 points is unlikely to decrease competi-
tion and ordinarily needs no further analysis, but a merger increasing the
HHI by 50 to 100 points may decrease competition and needs further
analysis. In a highly concentrated market, a merger increasing the 1Il by
more than 100 points will be presumed to decrease competition absent other
138. The first part is unnecessary in two types of horizontal mergers, which are called
product extension mergers and geographic extension mergers. See infra at p. 300-301.
139. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
140. Id. at 363. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)(explaining that ordinarily market or monopoly power may be inferred from predominant
share of the market).
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proof or remedial action.'
The first step in finding the HHIl for a relevant market is to list each
competitor in that market. These are, at a minimum, the companies that
actually provide the relevant product (for example, some form of mobile
service and, perhaps, POTS) within the geographic market. 42 A company
that provides the product in only a small part of the geographic market
should not be excluded from the list solely for this reason. The company
may have a small market share, but its existence in the relevant market is
a fact and should be reflected in any measurement of its competitors.
Careful consideration should also be given to including companies, such as
nationwide paging carriers or satellite systems, that are in the product
market but whose only coverage is nationwide. Depending on the facts, it
may be appropriate to include a small share of their nationwide totals in a
local or regional market.
To calculate the HHI, some measurement of market share must be
used for all competitors. The best measurement is that which determines
the future competitive significance of competitors in the relevant mar-
ket. 43 Possible measurements include: numbers of current customers;
numbers of recently added customers' 44 or some other measure of
141. Use of the HHI to measure market power has received some judicial sanction. FTC
v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986); FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F.
Supp. 27, 34 (D.D.C. 1988). But see Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (Certain HHI calculations are "of no evidentiary value" and "totally
lacking in evidentiary weight.").
The Commission has adopted several similar objective rules, called "spectrum caps,"
which limit how many MHz of spectrum any one company may control in the same area.
These are: (1) 25 MHz of cellular spectrum (47 C.F.R. § 22.902(b)(5) (1995)); (2) for
cellular carriers, 10 MHz of broadband PCS spectrum (47 C.F.R. § 24.204(a) (1995)); (3)
45 MHz of cellular, SMR, and broadband PCS spectrum (47 C.F.R. § 20.6(a) (1995)); and
(4) three licenses for narrowband PCS spectrum (In re Amendment to the Comm'n's Rules
to Establish New Narrowband Personal Comm. Services, First Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 7162, paras. 32-34 (1994)). These spectrum caps appear to be ceilings, not safe
harbors, because the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau's and Commission's decisions
have given extensive analysis to the competitive effects of mergers that do not exceed the
spectrum caps. See sources cited supra note 3. The second spectrum cap stated above is
in litigation.
142. In a state where resellers are a significant presence, they may deserve the same
status as the "facilities-based" system operators. See supra note 30. "Uncommitted
entrants," discussed above, also might be listed.
143. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.41, at 20,573-74.
144. Measuring by units of service sold, instead of by customers, can avoid the mistake
of equating a customer with many units (e.g., a large corporation) and an individual
customer with only one.
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competition "at the margin"; gross revenues; 45 net revenues; minutes of
usage; population within licensed areas (POPs);1'4 and amount of spec-
trum, either allocated, licensed, or in use. The challenge in choosing a
method of measurement is to find one that assesses future competitive
significance, that is an "apples-to-apples" measurement for all companies
in the relevant market, and for. which numbers can be obtained without
undue expense, time, or revelation of proprietary data.
Any measurement by financial data or customer numbers poses
problems. First, the Commission has no established procedure for obtaining
competitors' financial results and customer numbers. Doing so also is time-
consuming and can be contentious. 47 Competitors that are not parties will
undoubtedly be reluctant to disclose their trade secrets in a case in which
they are bystanders. In addition, an "apples-to-apples" comparison of
financial data would need to reconcile data for services that are typically
charged on a usage-sensitive basis (e.g., cellular), for services that are
charged for on a per-month basis (e.g., paging and simple dispatch), and
for services that have only an initial payment and no recurring ones (e.g.,
private and federal government systems, unlicensed PCS, and low-end
systems). Likewise, any measurement by customer numbers would need to
reflect the true size of single customers, such as major corporations, that
subscribe to many units.'" For the next few years any revenue- or
customer-based measurement also would ignore PCS, which will have few
or no customers but is a real factor in the marketplace. PCS will almost
triple the spectrum available for common carrier services.
Allocated spectrum as a unit of measurement lists each block of
spectrum available for licensure by the Commission as a competitor and
reflects capacity, which is a good measurement of long-term ability to
145. CMRS prices are not regulated, but if revenues are used as the measurement, the
revenues of any service whose rates are regulated (e.g., POTS) can be altered to reflect any
distorted effect. See supra note 23.
146. See, e.g., In re the Comm'n's Rules to Establish Personal Communications
Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making Tentative Decision, 7 FCC Rcd. 5676, para. 57
n.41 (1992). The defect of POPs is that they measure potential customers or competitive
power, not actual customers or competitive power. Thus, POPs equate entrenched providers
and infant ones, although the former may have more competitive power than the latter.
147. See Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836 (1994).
Trade associations and securities analyses often publish types of financial results and
customer numbers. They do not do so systematically, however, and it would be an
extraordinary coincidence if they did so in conformity with the product and geographic
markets for a particular merger.
148. Customer numbers would also show cellular and paging services, which have
roughly the same number of customers, as equally powerful in the market. See supra pp.
256, 258. Few industry observers would deny, however, that cellular service, with its far
greater capabilities and higher prices, has more competitive significance than paging.
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compete. 149 Allocated spectrum also has the advantage of being reason-
ably accessible and indisputable. s0 Finally, using allocated as opposed
to licensed spectrum reflects uncommitted entrants and supply substitu-
tion. 151
Use of spectrum as a measurement may require complex refinements.
First, a measurement of "raw" spectrum gives equal weight to a chan-
nel 52 allocated to cellular service, which can carry one customer's
conversation, and to a channel allocated to paging service, which can
transmit momentary signals for thousands of customers. 15  This may
overstate the competitive power of relatively inefficient technologies, such
as cellular, and understate that of relatively efficient technologies, such as
paging.-" 4 To remedy any such imbalances, spectrum could be translated
149. Courts have held different kinds of capacity to be valid measurements of market
shares and market power. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486, 501 (1973) (Uncommitted capacity was measure of market power in business (coal
mining) where most sales were made pursuant to long-term contracts that had absorbed most
of the total capacity of the business.); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins.,
Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (Market power may be measured by "ownership
of the productive assets in the business."). See also 1 ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 300 & nn.139-41 (3rd ed. 1992) (citing cases where capacity is used as the measure
of market power). The Commission has recognized the importance of capacity in measuring
market power. In adopting its CMRS "spectrum caps" that limit the amount of spectrum
that any CMRS licensee may control, the Commission noted that "[the purpose of the cap
is to prevent licensees from artificially withholding capacity from the market. The
aggregation of spectrum measures the ability to withhold capacity from the market." CMRS
Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. para. 258.
150. The First Annual Report, describing various mobile radio services, states the
spectrum allocations available for most of those services. A difficulty in using spectrum as
the measurement in HHI calculations arises when listing competitors. See supra note 141.
While it is easily determinable, for example, that a 50 MHz cellular allocation of spectrum
should be divided between two competitors, each with 25 MHz, it is not clear whether or
how to make such a division for services such as unlicensed PCS and low-end services.
151. The Horizontal Guidelines include uncommitted entrants as present competitors but
do not specify how their market shares are to be measured. Horizontal Guidelines, supra
note 18, § 1.32, at 20,573-3. The Horizontal Guidelines do state, however, that one way
to measure market share is "capacity currently devoted to the relevant market together with
that which likely would be devoted to the relevant market in response to a 'small but
significant and nontransitory' price increase." Id. § 1.41, at 20,573-4.
152. A channel is a man-defined part of spectrum that is used for carrying a communica-
tion.
153. Fifty cellular MHz and 4.5 paging MHz each carry approximately the same number
of customers. CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. paras. 13, 29.
154. In the same vein, it is expected that broadband PCS systems will carry many more
calls per MHz than cellular systems. See, e.g., STANLEY M. BESEN & WILLIAM B.
BURNETT, CHARLES RIVER Assocs., AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR
MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 35-40 (1993). See also DR. GEORGE A.
KEYWORTH ET AL., PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION, THE TELECOM REVOLU-
TION-AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY 12-13 (1995); CS FIRST BOSTON, supra note 94, at 19,
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into channels that are actually used or into some other measurement that
reflects how different services and technologies use the same amount of
spectrum. Another necessary refinement would reduce the allocations to
nationwide services, such as satellite-based systems and nationwide paging,
to reflect how much of their nationwide allocation is devoted to the
particular geographic market that is involved in the merger.
a. An Example of the HHI in a Horizontal Mobile Services
Merger
The following is an illustration of an HII for the merger of two PCS
carriers, one with a 30 MHz license and the other with a 10 MHz
license."55 In this illustration, the following assumptions are made:
(1) the judicial test of reasonable interchangeability rather than
the Five Percent Question is the standard for defining the product
market;
(2) the product market is two-way voice service, which consists
of cellular, interconnected SMRs, and arbitrarily chosen small
amounts of maritime, interconnected private radio systems, low-
end services, federal government systems, and POTS;'5 6
(3) broadband PCS is included in the product market;
(4) there are no submarkets;
(5) allocated spectrum is the measurement of competitive
significance in the market, with no modifications to reflect
efficient and inefficient uses or technologies;
(6) the cost of changing out-terminal equipment is not a
significant barrier to interservice or intercarrier competition;
(7) each cellular carrier has acquired one of the 10 MHz
broadband PCS licenses, but the third remains independent and
is the target of the merger in question;
(8) of all the SMRs in the geographic market, only two are
interconnected, one large and one small;
(9) resellers have no competitive significance in the geographic
32-33.
155. Such a merger is permitted by the Commission's spectrum caps. See supra note
141.
156. There are methods other than the arbitrary assignment of market shares to show the
competitive significance of entities whose inclusion in the product market is questionable
when no statistical data are available. One method is to exclude all data about them from
Hi calculations, but to set higher HI1 thresholds than the Horizontal Guidelines. See,
e.g., Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 979, 980 n.7 (1993). A second
method is to include the questionable entities in the HI calculations, but to give their data
less weight than is given to the data of the entities that are unquestionably in the product
market. See, e.g., Iowa Nat'l Bankshares Corp., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 342, 344 (1994). A
third method is to calculate HHI without such entities and, if the HI indicates an unduly
concentrated market, to consider such entities as mitigating factors without a specific
numerical value. See, e.g., Keycorp, 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 286, 288 (1995).
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market;
(10) air-ground, unlicensed PCS, and satellite-based services
are niche competitors whose interchangeablility with services in
the product market is insignificant;
(11) there is significant use of maritime service and pay
phones, a form of POTS, because the geographic market
includes a major harbor and rivers that are recreational areas;
and
(12) the geographic market is a metropolitan area.
Table 1. Pre-Merger HHI
Competitor
Cellular Carrier A
Cellular Carrier B
Broadband PCS A
Broadband PCS B
Broadband PCS C
Broadband PCS D
Large Interconnected SMR
Small Interconnected SMR
Private Radio
Federal Government
Maritime
CB Radio
POTS
Pre-Merger Total
MHz
35
35
30
30
30
10
10
3
3
2
2
1
1
192
Market Share %
18
18
16
16
16
5
5
2
2
1
1
0
0
100
Table 2. Post-Merger HHI
Competitor
Cellular Carrier A
Cellular Carrier B
Broadband PCS A
Broadband PCS B
Broadband PCS C
Broadband PCS D
Large Interconnected SMR
Small Interconnected SMR
Private Radio
Federal Government
Maritime
CB Radio
POTS
Post-Merger Total
MHz
35
35
40
30
30
10
3.
3
2
2
1
1
192
Market Share %
18
18
21
16
16
Net Change: HHI increase of 185.
Square
324
324
256
256
256
25
25
4
4
1
1
0
0
1,476
Square
324
324
441
256
256
25
4
4
1
1
0
0
1,661
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Applying the Horizontal Guidelines' standards for HHI numbers, the
market is "moderately concentrated" before and after the merger. The
merger increases the HHI by 185 points, which means that the merger
"potentially raise[s] significant competitive concerns," and its competitive
effects probably warrant further analysis.
57
2. Further Analysis
The Horizontal Guidelines state that the HHI is "only the starting
point" and that further analysis of the merger is always needed.'58 What
the HHI does, as a practical matter, is to assign the burden of proof. If the
HHI is favorable to a merger, its opponents bear a heavy burden of proof
in showing that it will decrease competition. If the HHI numbers are
unfavorable, the proponents of the merger bear a heavy burden of proof in
showing that it will not decrease competition. If the HHI numbers are in
the middle range, both sides continue the analysis. In any event, analysis
of the factors described below may condemn a merger that passed the HHI
and may save one that failed it.
In discharging their respective burdens over the years, proponents and
opponents of mergers have constructed a "Rogues Gallery" of anticompet-
itive effects of horizontal mergers. What follows is a tour of the most
repellent exhibits.
a. Dangers to Competition in Horizontal Mergers
1. Diminished Innovation
Every horizontal merger eliminates one company from the industry,
resulting in one less source of innovation and experimentation. This
argument is flawed because it is difficult to quantify. Counsel needs to
make arguments about diminished innovation and experimentation as
precise as possible.
157. If both the pre- and post-merger HHIs had been under 1000, or if the net increase
in the HHI had been less than 100, under the Horizontal Guidelines the merger would be
unlikely to have anticompetitive effects and ordinarily would require no further analysis.
Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.51(a)-(b), at 20,573-5 to -6. If, however, the
post-merger HHI had been over 1800, then the merger-the HHI increased more than 50-
would be presumed to have anticompetitive effects. Id. § 1.51(c), at 30,573-6.
158. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 2.0, at 20,573-6. Indeed, some scholarly
analysts of horizontal mergers criticize all the matters discussed so far in this Arti-
cle-product markets, geographic markets, and objective measurements like HHI-as a
.paint by the numbers" approach that gives a "false air of precision" to merger analysis.
See Hruska, supra note 21, at 313. These analysts would begin their analysis of horizontal
mergers with the factors discussed in this subsection.
Number 2]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
2. Greater Ease of Coordinated Interaction
The fewer the competitors, especially powerful ones, remaining in a
market after a merger, the easier it is for them to engage in "coordinated
interaction," such as fixing prices, limiting output, allocating customers or
markets,'59 or simply to fail to compete vigorously. Several elements of
the mobile services industry, particularly its cellular component, make
illicit coordinated interaction more likely than it would be in a typical
industry. The same companies are often partners in one market and
competitors in another."6 This allows their partnership meetings in one
market to become a forum for discussions about coordinated interaction in
their other markets.
Also, most cellular carriers are affiliates of much larger companies
whose core business is POTS. The latter companies, therefore, have both
the incentive, and through their supply of local exchange interconnection
facilities, the opportunity to stunt the growth of mobile services as
competitors to POTS. 6 ' Third, the number of companies in the cellular
industry has continually diminished as independent licensees have merged
into large corporate structures that are dominated by providers of
POTS. 62 Finally, broadband PCS licensees, with few exceptions, are the
159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS 11-12 (1994); Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, §§ 2.0-2.2, at 20,573-6
to -8. "Coordinated interaction" can occur simply by a significant reduction in the number
of companies that interact. Mergers may also allow competitors to lessen competition
through unilateral actions, especially in the case of differentiated services and products or
markets with limited capacities. Id. §§ 2.2-2.22, at 20,573-8 to -9.
160. See, e.g., In re Applications of MMM Holdings, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 8243, paras. 27-30 (1989). For example, as of late 1994, McCaw and
BellSouth were partners in Los Angeles and Houston and competitors in Miami and
Orlando; BellSouth and US Cellular were partners in Nashville and Baton Rouge and
competitors in Los Angeles and Bakersfield; and BellSouth and Southwestern Bell were
partners in Gary and competitors in Houston.
161. The Commission found this danger minimal when it created cellular service because
of the high price of cellular service and the low capacity of cellular systems compared to
POTS. In re Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular
Communications Systems, Reportand Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, para. 32 (1981). However,
new technology may make wireless services a serious competitor to POTS. See CMRS First
Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 75 n.155. Such a development would create a risk that
POTS providers would stunt the growth of wireless as a competitor indefinitely, or at least
until their wireline systems are fully depreciated.
162. One reason the Commission approved the AT&T-McCaw merger was that McCaw
was the last large cellular service provider that had not been acquired by a company whose
primary interest was in POTS. Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 5836, para. 58 (1994).
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same companies that dominate the cellular industry.63 In a business with
a structure so conducive to coordinated interaction, collusion need not be
express, as in a formal agreement to fix prices. An oligopolistic structure
facilitates a laziness in competition that can produce the same results as
express collusion (e.g., high prices, low quality, and lack of innova-
tion).1' A horizontal merger will negatively affect competition if it will
increase any of these structural infirmities.
On the other hand, these risks may not be as great as they appear. In
the thirteen years since the commercial cellular industry began, there is no
known case of express coordinated interaction-a remarkable achievement
for a business in which there are only two sellers and so many incentives.
Mobile services are, and will increasingly be, characterized by growing
demand, supply, and technical innovation," making coordinated interac-
tion relatively difficult to affect. Broadband PCS, by injecting several new
competitors into each area, will make coordinated interaction, even among
old friends, significantly more complicated and more difficult. These
factors will reduce the risk of mergers facilitating coordinated interaction.
3. Potential Competition
If the purpose of a merger is for the acquiring company to enter a
new activity or territory by purchasing an existing company, the question
arises whether the acquiring company could do so alone, without
eliminating an existing competitor. The question is rephrased slightly when
two or more companies jointly attempt to enter a business or territory that
is new to both of them. In that situation, the issue is whether each could
enter the new business or territory alone, thus, resulting in two new
competitors instead of just one.16
Affirmatively improving competition in a product market is, perhaps,
beyond the scope of merger law, whose principal goal is to prevent
163. The only major broadband PCS licensees that do not also have a major presence in
the cellular and POTS businesses are AT&T and Wirelessco, a joint venture of three cable
television companies and the interexchange carrier Sprint.
164. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ("Some truth lurks in the cynical
remark that not high profits but a quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power.").
165. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 53-56.
166. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 100-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Application
of Alascom, Inc., AT&T Corp. and Pacific Telecom, Inc. for Transfer of Control of
Alascom, Inc. from Pacific Telecom, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Order and Authorization, in File
No. W-P-C 7037 et al., FCC 95-334 (Aug. 2, 1995) Dhereinafter AT&T-Alascom].
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deteriorations in competition.' 67 However, a merger such as described in
the preceding paragraph will damage competition in the premerger market
in two circumstances. The first occurs when the companies in the
premerger market perceive that one or both of the merging companies
would enter the market de novo. This actuates the companies in that market
to keep prices lower, quality higher, and innovation faster than they
otherwise would do. The second arises if one or both of the merging
companies was actually planning to enter the market de novo and then
decided instead to take the less adventurous step of entry by merger. In
either situation, the merger will reduce competition.
Both these ideas are captured by the doctrine of "potential competi-
tion," which case law has divided into two types. The first, "perceived
potential competition," focuses on the market about to be entered and the
companies already in it, and holds that:
competition might be diminished if a company which industry
participants had thought might actually enter the market on its
own instead simply acquired a company already in that market.
... [The doctrine recognizes] the probability that the acquiring
firm prompted premerger procompetitive effects within the target
market by being perceived by the existing firms in that market
as likely to enter de novo. The elimination of such present
procompetitive effects may render a merger unlawful under § 7
[of the Clayton Act.] Perceived potential competition focuses on
the premerger effect on prices of the perception that if profits
rise, a new company will enter the market and drive down both
prices and profits. 161
The second, "actual potential competition," focuses on the acquiring
company and has the following elements:
1. the relevant market is oligopolistic; 2. absent the acquisition,
the acquiring firm would have entered the market in the near
future, either de novo or through acquisition of a little company;
and 3. such entry by the acquiring firm carried a substantial
likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of the market
or other significant procompetitive effects. 169
167. § 7 of the Clayton Act, for example, forbids only those mergers that reduce
competition or tend to create monopoly. See supra note 6. It does not authorize the
government to order improvements in the premerger status quo.
168. Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235,
1253-54 (3rd Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (summarizing United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-37 (1973) and United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974)). See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
169. Alberta Gas Chemicals, 826 F.2d at 1254-55 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (summarizing Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 630 and Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC,
689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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Both scenarios require the merger's opponent do more than show that
de novo entry is possible. To establish perceived potential competition, it
must be shown that incumbent competitors actually fear entry by the
acquiring company enough to lower price, and raise quality, and that after
the merger there will be no other newcomers to keep the incumbent
providers competing vigorously. Actual potential competition requires a
showing that, but for the merger, the acquiring company would have
entered the market. Such a showing is difficult to make without access to
the acquiring company's files and the ability to ascertain its executives'
inner thoughts.
In a business where de novo entry requires a radio license, potential
competition arguments can be made only if allocated and unlicensed
spectrum for new entrant exists. Only then is entry possible by means other
than a merger with an incumbent provider. This has not occurred
frequently because mobile services have suffered from a chronic shortage
of spectrum. 7 However, if the Commission creates a surplus of spec-
trum,17 1 potential competition may become a valid objection to mobile
services mergers.
4. Prior "Bad Acts" by a Party to the Merger
A party to a merger, especially the one that will control the post-
merger company, that has a history of anticompetitive conduct (e.g.,
adjudicated violations of the antitrust laws or anticompetitive torts), raises
the possibility of reduced competition after the merger. 72 Assuming that
it can be proven that a prior anticompetitive act occurred, 73 its materiali-
170. The historic excess of demand for spectrum may not connote a shortage as much
as it reflects the fact that until recently the Commission gave spectrum away for free. When
something is free, the demand for it will usually exceed the supply.
171. In addition to PCS spectrum, mobile services might be provided on 25 MHz of
spectrum that was recently reallocated from federal government use and on spectrum now
used for fixed "wireless cable" service, called Local Multipoint Distribution Service. See
CMRS First Annual Report, supra note 33, 10 FCC Rcd. 8872, para. 83 & n.167.
172. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 2.1, at 20,573-7. Such matters can be
stated as "character" issues rather than, or in addition to, competitive ones. BAMS-NYNEX,
77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, paras. 33-35 (1995).
173. Even if the act is proven, there may be disagreements about whether it was
anticompetitive. Counsel who are accustomed to the friendly repartee that characterizes
regulated oligopolies may have difficulty distinguishing between unlawful acts and the
"rough and tumble" of the marketplace that benefits consumers. BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) para. 36 & n.56. See also Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469,
471 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Competition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and
a boon to society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of these qualities that make
it a bane to other producers.").
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ty to the merger should be evaluated by asking several questions. Was the
act committed by a merging company, or was the perpetrator an affiliate
over which the merging company had no control and/or from which it
derived no benefit? Is the act a common industry practice that is the subject
of a current rule making or complaint proceeding where its effects can be
better addressed? 74 If the bad act is objectionable under the foregoing
criteria, will the merger increase either the likelihood of its repetition or
the severity of its negative effects on competition? This last question is
most important because it focuses on the central competitive issue in
mergers: the potential for the merger to cause a reduction in competition
as opposed to the continuation of preexisting anticompetitive condi-
tions.'75
b. Benefits to Competition in Horizontal Mergers
While horizontal mergers may dampen competition, case law and
economic theory have fashioned arguments that can be made in their favor.
Some of these arguments concede that competition may decrease, but shift
the blame from the merging companies. Alternatively, these arguments
show either that factors outside the merger will remedy any negative effect
on competition or that the merger will ultimately increase competition.
Other arguments deny that the merger will weaken competition.
1. Regulation
The Commission is "mindful of the need ... to take into account
possible distortions in the competitive marketplace produced by current
rules." '176 For example, when the Commission allocated spectrum for two
competing cellular systems in each area, it effectively forbade another
entrant. If problems with competition that are expected in the post-merger
market can be attributed to the Commission or a state regulatory body, then
the merger's anticompetitive effects may be viewed in a less sinister light.
In such a case, the merging companies cannot be held responsible for
causing the problem."7 Or, the merging companies can hope that regula-
174. If the anticompetitive act was committed by a merging company, then it is
potentially serious, but if the bad actor was a mere corporate relative, then it may be less
so. See, e.g., BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) para. 41 & n.70.
175. § 7 of the Clayton Act on its face prohibits only those mergers that will reduce
competition. See supra note 6.
176. CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, para. 24 n.20 (1994).
177. See Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. Newvector Comm., Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir.
1989) ("Reliance on statistical market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best
a tricky enterprise and is downright folly where, as here, the predominant market share is
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tion will be altered to remove the anticompetitive effect on the market. 78
2. Efficiencies
Horizontal mergers may create financial savings, 179 economies of
scale," economies of scope,"' or other efficiencies." z For example,
a merger might make possible a new packaged offering such as telephone,
paging, and dispatch services in one piece of terminal equipment.SO A
merger may create efficiencies of a more cultural nature, such as the
combination of a cash-rich, stodgy company with a cash-poor, fleet-footed
one."I4 If two such companies can combine their respective strengths,
their merger will result in a net improvement in the competitiveness of the
market.
Several questions are relevant concerning each allegedly procompet-
itive effect. First, how great is it? Increases in efficiency can range from
the breathtaking to the trivial. The parties to the merger should attempt to
document the merger's potential effects: including how many jobs and/or
dollars will be saved; how much faster calls will be carried; or how many
new offerings will be and made how soon. If they do, the question arises
whether the demonstrated quantities are impressive compared to the
the result of regulation."); AT&T-Alascom, Order and Authorization, in File No. W-P-C
7037 et al., FCC 95-334, para. 45 (Aug. 2, 1995) (Analysis of competitive effects of a
merger would recognize that competition in the relevant market was constrained by
geography and express government policy that limited competition.).
178. A recent example is the Commission's approval of a substantial concentration of
SMR licenses in the hands of one company, in part on grounds of the impending licensing
of PCS and the removal of the prohibition of cellular companies providing SMR-like
dispatch service. Motorola, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 7783, para. 18 n.51 (1995), petition
for reconsideration pending.
179. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 4, at 20,573-11 to -12.
180. Economies of scale, or increasing returns to scale, exist when the average cost of
producing a product or service falls as the quantity of the product or service produced
increases. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 9, at 920. See also Kalish v. Franklin
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
181. Economies of scope exist when "it is less costly for one firm to perform two
activities than for two specialized firms to perform them separately." CARLTON & PERLOFF,
supra note 9, at 920. See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1581
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (defining the economies of scope as "the capacity to produce related goods
or services at an aggregate cost lower than the total for each produced separately.").
182. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLEs FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 125
(1995).
183. There would be economies of scope if it cost less for one company to offer cellular
and paging services together than if two different suppliers offered the services.
184. Some claim this was an advantage of the merger of AT&T and McCaw.
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merger's size.""
Second, will the efficiencies enhance competitiveness? For example,
it is reasonable to expect that faster call processing or new offerings. will
improve the merged company's service and will cause remaining competi-
tors to improve their own services-clearly a procompetitive result." On
the other hand, if financial savings, such as from merging two companies'
customer service departments, are all that is expected, the question arises
whether the benefits will accrue solely to the shareholders or will be passed
on to consumers, reinvested in improved service, or otherwise devoted to
improving competition." 8
Third and most important, is the merger necessary for the efficiency
to be realized? Could such efficiency be achieved without a merger?"
For example, after a cellular merger, the people who were customers of
each merging company may be spared surcharges for roaming in areas that
used to be the other merging company's territory.'89 Is such a change,
however, an efficiency made possible by the merger, or simply a rate
reduction that could be achieved by the companies agreeing to waive
roaming charges for each other's customers?"9° Alternatively, the merged
company may plan to charge the same price in all its geographic markets
after the merger. Such a change would aid competition by reducing
possible confusion for customers and, most important, would be almost
impossible to arrange between two independent companies.' 9'
3. Ease of Entry
It is possible for a company to have a high market share, even to be
a monopoly in the sense of being the only seller, and still be efficient. The
185. The parties also must satisfy the usual standards for credibility. Relatively credible
evidence, for example, would be an estimate of savings that the acquiring company used
in its business operations, such as in deciding whether to buy the acquired company or how
much to pay for it. Less credible evidence would be a study that was created as evidence
for use in litigation before the Commission. See, e.g., Betts v. Shalala, Civ. A. No. 94-
2171-GTV, 1995 WL 164502, at *10 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1995) (testimony of a treating
physician is entitled to more weight than testimony of a physician hired as an expert witness
for litigation).
186. BAMS-NyNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, para. 46 (1995).
187. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-23; FTC v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 52 (D.D.C. 1988).
188. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 0.2, at20,571 (The DOJ "assesses any
efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be achieved by the parties through other means.").
189. After the merger, all these customers will be customers of the merged company;
and most cellular carriers do not impose roaming charges on their own customers.
190. See, e.g., CS FIRST BOSTON, supra note 94, at 6.
191. If the carriers were competitors, it would be a crime. E.g., United States v. Hayter
Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1265 (6th Cir. 1995).
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company may know that inefficiency or abuse of its customers will cause
new competitors to spring up, enter the market, and deny it the fruits of
any attempted exercise of market power.192 Such a market has "ease of
entry."193 This is a long-term view of "supply side substitution" or
uncommitted entry discussed in Part (I)(A)(4)(b)(1). 194 Thus, a proponent
of a merger sustains it by showing that the post-merger market would be
one in which any conduct aimed at stifling competition would be thwarted
by new competitors entering the market.
In a mobile services merger, the proponent of the "ease of entry"
defense might be required to show affirmatively that the resources needed
to enter the market are readily available and could be deployed with modest
effort in a reasonably short time. The first resource might be spectrum-the
raw material needed for any mobile service. The proponent of "ease of
entry" would have to show that enough new spectrum exists to allow entry
into the relevant market. The proponent also could demonstrate that the
legal and regulatory barriers to entry would be negligible or, if significant,
could be surmounted with reasonable effort.195 Another required showing
might be that the financial capital needed to enter a business is available in
the financial markets. This would be especially important to show ease of
entry into mobile telephone service-a business in which millions must be
invested before the first dollar of revenue is earned.196 A proponent could
192. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 559 (1973) ("The
existence of an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the
same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market [is]
a substantial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated."); Rebel Oil Co. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
193. See, e.g., McCaw Personal Comm., Inc., v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp.
1166, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (citing United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d
976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984)). See also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 149,
at 307-11 and cases cited supra note 149; Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.0, at
20,572 n.7, § 3, at 20,573-9 to 20,574.
194. As long as the fact of impending or possible entry is considered in competitive
analysis, it may not matter to the outcome whether it is considered in product market
definition, in naming competitors for HHI tables, or in an ease of entry "defense." See
State of New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,911, 1995
WL 77881, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1995). The sooner in the analytical process is it
considered, however, the sooner its impact, if any, is clear.
195. State regulation of CMRS entry is defunct. See CMRS FirstAnnual Report, 10 FCC
Rcd. para. 22 & n.31. However, local zoning and environmental procedures may pose
major barriers to rapid entry into CMRS.
196. Access by applicants to necessary financing is often challenged in mobile radio
licensing proceedings. In re Applications of Metro Mobile CTS, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Reconsideration, 8 FCC Rcd. 8675, paras. 21-30 (1993); Paging Network of
Virginia, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 1016, paras. 6, 12-19
(1995).
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also show that the necessary "human capital"-persons with the necessary
technical, financial, and marketing skills-is available in the labor market.
Other relevant contentions include that customers of existing providers
would not be "locked in" by long-term contracts or by the prohibitively
high cost of switching terminals. An additional argument is that a new
entrant could survive entirely on new customers. Finally, the proponent of
"ease of entry" might illustrate that all these barriers could be surmounted
in time to dissuade the merged company from attempting to abuse its
market power (e.g., by raising prices or failing to lower them).' 97 The
Horizontal Guidelines, for example, generally consider entry to be timely
if no more than two years elapse from "initial planning to significant
market impact."'' 98 The same period has support in case law.19
Establishing availability of spectrum may present differing degrees of
difficulty for various mobile services. For example, there appears to be an
enormous amount of spectrum available for paging service. The FCC has
allocated approximately 4.5 MHz to it.' The FCC also has allocated
large spectrum amounts for cellular and SMR services (50 and 21 MHz,
respectively), broadband and narrowband PCS (120 and 3 MHz respective-
ly), and FM and television subcarriers all of which also may be used for
paging service. 20'
Dispatch service may be more difficult to enter. It may be that the
spectrum allocated to PCS is, for technical reasons, useful for dispatch
service only with a large number of towers and intertower links. Quite
probably, the expense of such a network would put its price too far above
conventional dispatch and interconnected SMR services to be competitive.
As to cellular companies starting to provide dispatch, there appears to be
no technical problem with using cellular spectrum for dispatch service.
However, there may be an economic problem. If a cellular carrier earns
enormous profits by providing high-priced cellular service on all its
allocated spectrum, there may be no economic incentive to divert some of
that spectrum to relatively low-priced and, presumably, low-profit dispatch
197. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, §§ 3.0, 3.3 & n.28, 3.4, at 20,573-10 (asking
whether entry "would be sufficient to return market prices to their premerger levels").
198. Id. § 3.2, at 20,573-10.
199. See generally FTC v. Owens Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 51 (D.D.C. 1988).
200. This consists of 3 MHz allocated to paging and 1.5 MHz allocated to precellular
mobile telephone service.
201. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Pepper, Chief, FCC Office of Plans and Policy,
to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT) 12-13 (May 5, 1995) (Contact the Office of Plans and
Policy of the FCC for a copy of this letter at (202) 632-7000.). Spectrum that may be
available for paging service in a few years includes the 3.5 M-Iz that is allocated to LEO
satellites. See supra note 46.
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service.' Assuming the validity of this pessimistic view, any new entry
into dispatch may have to come from new satellite systems2°3 and from
the spectrum transferred from federal government to private use.? 4 If all
these allocations become available for mobile services, there might be a
surplus of spectrum and, as far as access to it is concerned, great "ease of
entry" into any and all segments of the industry.m 5
4. Failing or Floundering Company
Sometimes a company's market share overstates its actual power.3
This can occur when high numbers represent past sales or a hammerlock
on unprofitable customers or areas,' or when a company with healthy
revenues becomes marginal through mismanagement. If the acquired
company is floundering, 8 and if ceasing operations would cause its
corporate assets, including spectrum, to cease to be used to provide the
relevant product, then a merger will not hinder competition as much as
originally thought. In other words, the failing company's absorption into
another through a merger is the only way for it to continue in the market.
Such a situation seems unlikely at present, because the mobile services
industry has been hugely successful in the past decade.' However, if a
glut of spectrum is created, this industry may start showing a failure rate
typical of the business world as a whole.
202. See, e.g., Cellular Companies Showing Little, If Any Interest in Dispatch, LAND
MOBILE RADIO NEwS, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Compub File.
203. See supra note 46. The Commission has allocated 33 MHz for LEO satellites.
204. See supra note 61, 171. Because of technical limitations, much of the spectrum
being transferred from the government may not be usable for mobile services without
significant developmental research and testing.
205. Some industry observers doubt the prospects of broadband PCS, especially for
creating three new providers of mobile telephone service outside large cities. See supra note
52.
206. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 5, at 20,574; FTC v. University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 1991).
207. AT&T-Alascom, Order and Authorization, in File No. W-P-C 7037 et al., FCC 95-
334, para. 49 n.74 (Aug. 2, 1995) (Company has 60% market share largely because of its
monopoly in unprofitable areas that it is obliged to serve.).
208. A "failing" company is one that is close to ceasing operations. A "floundering"
company is one that is not yet failing, but shows significant signs of impending failure and
has chronic problems that dash any realistic hope of recovery.
209. For example, there is no known case of a cellular company ceasing operations.
CMRS First Annual Report, 10 FCC Rcd. para. 81.
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c. A Note on Horizontal Extension Mergers
1. Product Extension Mergers
If a merger is between two mobile service companies that are in
different product markets, such as a merger of a cellular service company
and a paging service company in a case where those services have been
found to be in different product markets,2 0 then there will be no increase
in concentration in any relevant market, and no HHIs need be calculated.
Such mergers are called product extension mergers and should be analyzed
under all the factors described. The factors most likely to be important are
the anticompetitive factor of potential competition2 and the procompet-
itive factor of efficiency.
2. Geographic Extension Mergers
If a merger is between two companies in the same product market but
in different geographic markets, such as a merger between a cellular
service company in city A and a cellular service company in city B, then
there is no increase in concentration in any relevant market, and no HHIs
need be calculated. Such mergers are called geographic extension mergers
and, like product extension mergers, should be analyzed under all described
factors, especially potential competition and efficiency. 12 Because of the
efficiencies that can be affected by such mergers and the alleged value of
a regional or national brand name, geographic extension mergers are
common in those mobile services that were initially licensed for relatively
atomized territories.2 3
210. This could be classified initially as a conglomerate merger. The similarity of the
merging companies' services, however, makes it prudent to give it closer scrutiny than is
normally given to conglomerate mergers. See supra notes 135-36.
211. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
212. See, e.g., BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, paras. 45-46 (1995). For
a good description of the potential efficiencies and inefficiencies of horizontal integration
in cable television, a business with some similarities to the cellular duopoly, see In re
Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, First Report, 9 FCC Rcd. 7442, paras. 148-156 (1994).
213. Frequently, a competitor of one of the merging companies will complain that it has
not integrated horizontally as quickly as the merging companies propose to do, and that
their "headstart" will confer on them an enormous competitive advantage. This argument
fails because it raises the specter of harm to the competitor rather than that of harm to
competition, which is the legitimate concern of competitive analysis. See Brown Shoe Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484,
1492, 1494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The Commission has consistently rejected pleas by late-
comers for relief from the headstarts of other, "fleeter-footed" licensees. See, e.g., In re
Nationwide Wireless Network Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 3635,
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B. Vertical Mergers
So far, this Article has concentrated on horizontal mergers. A vertical
merger may have any of the dangers and benefits to competition concerning
horizontal mergers, except for diminished innovation and greater ease of
coordinated interaction, to the extent they concern those effects in the same
product market. 14 However, there are a few special considerations
applicable to vertical mergers, which require separate examination.215
Vertical mergers, as a whole, are now considered beneficial for
competition and consumers. Negotiations between buyer and seller that
were time-consuming in the past can now be completed quickly by the
president of the merged company. In the same way, retailers' knowledge
about customers' needs can be shared freely with manufacturing personnel,
leading to shorter times between the planning and offering of new products
and services." 6 Viewed in this light, vertical mergers are considered
benign unless they are affirmatively shown to be without the foregoing
benefits or they have one or more of the flaws peculiar to either horizontal
or vertical mergers. Flaws specific to vertical mergers are described below.
A vertical merger's first potential anticompetitive effect is when one
of the merging companies has market power in a relevant market and, if
the merger occurs, will be able to use that power to gain market power or
at least an unreasonable advantage in a market where the other merging
company is already present.217 This can happen when the upstream
3638-39 (1994); In re GTE Mobilnet of Houston L.P., Order on Reconsideration, 8 FCC
Rcd. 2728, n.5 (1993); In re Century Cellunet of Jackson MSA L.P., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 6150, 6151 (1991).
214. See Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n 1984 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, § 4.24, at 20,567; § 5.1, at 20,567 [hereinafter Vertical
Guidelines]. The portions of the Vertical Guidelines cited in this Article are reaffirmed in
the Horizontal Guidelines. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, at 20,569.
215. Concerning competitive analysis of vertical mergers generally, see Michael H.
Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995).
216. Id. at 519, 522-27.
217. For example, the AT&T-McCaw merger combined a duopolist in cellular service
(McCaw) with a company in the relatively competitive business of interexchange service
(AT&T). It was feared that McCaw would require its customers to use AT&T interexchange
service, thus leveraging its power in cellular service to reduce competition in interexchange
service. Craig 0. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, paras. 63-
67 (1994).
There is disagreement in the case law about whether the necessary showing of this
danger is merely that the merged company will have an unreasonable advantage over its
competitors or that it will achieve full-blown market power. See Fineman v. Armstrong
World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1992) (comparing Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
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merging company sells something ("inputs") to the competitors of the
downstream merging company. The upstream company can stop supplying
them, raise their price, or lower their quality after the merger, and
competitors may be unable to procure comparable inputs elsewhere.18
For example, the AT&T-McCaw merger combined McCaw, a cellular
service company, with AT&T, a company that sold networks to McCaw's
competitors and, in so doing, came into possession of many of McCaw's
competitors' trade secrets. McCaw's competitors feared that those secrets
would be leaked to McCaw. Similarly, if the upstream merging company
sells inputs to the competitors of the downstream merging company, it may
come into possession of the competitors' proprietary information and leak
that information to its downstream affiliate.2 9
The second potential anticompetitive effect is that it will require other
companies in the two relevant markets to affiliate with each other and/or
will require that future entrants into one market also simultaneously enter
the other market. This may reduce competition in sales to downstream
companies' by turning each downstream company into a captive
(1980) ("[The use of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive
advantage in another is a violation of section 2 [of the Sherman Act], even if there has not
been an attempt to monopolize the second market.") with Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992) (In order
to prevail upon a theory of monopoly leveraging, a plaintiff must prove threatened or actual
monopoly in the leveraged market.)).
218. See Riordan & Salop, supra note 215, at 520-22, 527-51. When they are "locked
in" to the upstream merging company because of long-term contracts, proprietary technical
specifications, or other unusual conditions, downstream competitors may be unable to obtain
their inputs elsewhere. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 476-78 (1992); Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-44 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985); Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 54-
56.
219. The Commission, however, found that likelihood to be minimal because if AT&T
did that, it would quickly lose hundreds of millions of dollars earned annually from the Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs), who purchased its cellular networks. Moreover, the BOCs
would never buy any PCS networks from AT&T. Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. paras.
109-13, aft'd, SBC Comm., Inc., v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1495-96 (1995). The BOCs also
feared that AT&T would sell defective networks to McCaw's competitors and would
provide inferior maintenance and repair to the networks it had already sold to them. Again,
the Commission found this fear to be fanciful because AT&T would lose the BOCs as
customers. In both cases, the Commission found that such misconduct by AT&T would be
rational, and, therefore, likely, only if there was a reasonable likelihood that McCaw would
gain more in cellular service revenues than AT&T would lose in network sales. The
Commission generally found no such likelihood. But see Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd.
paras. 56, 99, 182.
220. For example, the AT&T-McCaw merger combined a duopolist in cellular service,
McCaw, with a competitor in the relatively competitive business of manufacturing cellular
networks, AT&T. Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 50-56, 97-100. If there had been
only two cellular service companies in the United States, and McCaw was one of them,
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customer of its upstream affiliate. A vertical merger also may increase the
cost of entry"' and lead to rigidity in the two relevant markets. A third
potential anticompetitive effect involves a maverick company that will be
disciplined by the other merging company, thus reducing competition and
increasing the risk of collusion in the former company's market.M The
fourth effect is that each merging company, having easier access to the
information of the other one, will be in a better position than before to act
as the coordinator of price-fixing or other collusion among the other
companies in either market.' Finally, if the upstream company is
unregulated, and the downstream company is a monopoly that is regulated
ineffectively, the upstream company may sell its products to its downstream
affiliate at inflated prices, which will then be passed on to the monopolist's
captive customers.2 4
The seriousness of each of these risks depends on the facts of each
relevant market, which need careful examination. If both the upstream and
the downstream markets are reasonably competitive, it is unlikely that any
of these ill effects will occur. Usually, the anticompetitive effect in a
vertical merger involves the imperfections in one of the relevant markets
flowing through the merger into the other. Finally, in evaluating the
seriousness of any risk of anticompetitive effects, it is necessary to
remember that the vertical merger will decrease competition only if it
results in injury to consumers, such as higher prices or lower quality
goods. As with horizontal mergers, the focus is on harm to competition,
not to competitors.m
McCaw might buy networks only from AT&T after the merger. Furthermore, as a practical
matter, the AT&T-McCaw affiliation might prompt the other cellular service company to
affiliate with another manufacturer (e.g., Ericsson) and buy only from it, thus effectively
eliminating all other manufacturers of cellular networks-Motorola, Northern Telecom, and
Alcatel-and extending the duopoly from the downstream service market up to the
manufacturing market. See id.
221. Vertical Guidelines, supra note 214, §§ 4.211-12, at 20,566.
222. Id. § 4.222, at 20,567. See also Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 18, § 2.12, at
20,573-8.
223. Vertical Guidelines, supra note 214, § 4.221, at 20,566-67; Riordan & Salop, supra
note 215, at 557-61.
224. Vertical Guidelines, supra note 214, § 4.23, at 20,567; Riordan & Salop, supra
note 215, at 561-64. In public utility law, this is the "affiliated interest" issue. It must be
noted that if it is substantially likely that the vertical markets involved in the merger will
become one as a result of regulatory action, changing technology, or consumer preference,
then the merger is really a horizontal one and should be evaluated as such.
225. See Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Advertising L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1325
(4th Cir. 1995) ("Because the antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, and not
simply competitors, only injury caused by damage to the competitive process may form the
basis of an antitrust claim."). See also Riordan & Salop, supra note 215, at 523, 530, 547-
50, 564 and sources cited supra note 214.
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C. Relief
At the end of the foregoing analysis the Commission will find the
merger, on balance, to have a positive, negative, or no net effect on
competition. If the Commission finds either a positive or negligible effect,
then the associated transfer of radio licenses satisfies the competitive
component of the Commission's "public interest" standard, and, absent
other effects that are contrary to the public interest, the transfer should be
approved. 6 If, however, the merger will decrease competition, then the
Commission has at least two options. One is to analyze the other effects of
the merger under the public interest standard, and search for some good
effect that will outweigh the anticompetitive ones. Another option is
remedial action by the Commission to eliminate the merger's anticompet-
itive effects, or at least to reduce them enough to make the merger
procompetitive or neutral on the whole. The most common form of such
remedial action by the Commission is to require changes in the merger as
a condition of approval. 7
Conditions can take many forms. Conditions may require divestitures
that will lower the market share of the merged company below HHI
ceilings or spectrum caps. 8 Conditions may also be structural, such as
requirements that certain activities be conducted through separate
subsidiaries. 9 Conditions can also be behavioral, such as prohibiting an
226. Mergers can suffer from other defects that are relevant to the Commission's broad
.public interest" standard. Such defects include harm to universal telephone service and
national security. These defects do not concern competition and are, therefore, not discussed
in this Article.
227. For cases in which the Commission has imposed conditions, see, e.g., Craig 0.
McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Red. 5836, paras. 176-85 (1994); Nextel
Communications, Inc., Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 3361, para. 46 (1995); In re GTE Corp. &
Southern Pacific Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 235, 262-63 (1983);
In re GTE Corp. & Telenet Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 215,
217-22 (1982); In re GTE Corp. & Telenet Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 72
F.C.C.2d 111, 135-49 (1979); In re Xerox-Western Union Int'l, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 471, 496 (1979); In re Texas Broadcasting Corp.,
Assignor and the Times Mirror Co., Assignee for Assignment of Licensee of Station KTBC-
TV, Austin, Tex., Application, 42 F.C.C.2d 997, 998 (1973).
228. For example, in cellular mergers that result in the merged company having interests
in both cellular systems in a geographic market, the Commission requires that one interest
be divested. See, e.g., BAMS-NYNEX, 77 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487, paras. 22-23 (1995);
In re Contel Cellular Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 2080 (1991).
229. For a description of the costs and benefits of separate subsidiary requirements, see
Amendment to the Commission's Rules Concerning Maritime Communications, FirstReport
and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 8419, paras. 19-21 (1995). Independent of any transfer or
merger, the Commission has authority under §§ 218 and 303 (g) of the Communication Act
to investigate and regulate the corporate structure of companies within its jurisdiction. 47
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upstream company from discriminating in favor of its downstream
affiliate, 0 or requiringing disclosure of information concerning any
misconduct.23
Concerning each possible condition, several questions arise in the
interests of competition and efficient government regulation of business.
First, will the condition prevent all of the anticompetitive effects, or only
some of them? Second, will the condition reduce an equal or larger amount
of the procompetitive or other positive effects of the merger? Third, will
the condition be costly or complicated to enforce, or will it slow innovation
in a relevant market so much so that, on the whole, it will create costs,
disputes, and other problems that are as great as or larger than the ones it
solves? Only conditions that survive scrutiny under these standards will
result in procompetitive effects. Conditions that do not survive this scrutiny
should not be imposed, and the merger will remain one that, on the whole,
is anticompetitive.
CONCLUSION
If and when there is a surplus of frequencies for mobile services, total
flexibility of use of spectrum, and costless interchangeability of terminal
equipment, then the risks to competition due to mergers of mobile services
companies will be considered negligible. In the meantime, there may be
risks which require vigilance. Indeed, the transition from oligopoly to
competition may require a special vigilance. That is the time when
incumbent firms know that any ability they have to discourage and hobble
their new competitors is about to slip through their fingers forever. Beyond
this time of danger is a brighter prospect of a workably competitive market
for mobile services. Conceivably, such competition will drive down prices
enough to create real rivalry for POTS. Competitive analysis of mergers
in the mobile services industry, if rigorous, will preserve the promise of
the Commission's recent flood of spectrum onto the market and will turn
a comfortable oligopoly into a truly competitive business with consequent
benefits for consumers and this nation's economic and social life.
U.S.C. §§ 218, 303(g) (1994). See also In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 1
(1977), on reconsideration, 67 F.C.C.2d 1429 (1978); and MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 119 (1992) (The Commission "may control which
carriers compete ... and under what corporate structures.").
230. See, e.g., Craig 0. McCaw, 9 FCC Rcd. paras. 56, 99, 182
231. Id. paras. 116, 180. See, e.g., In re MCI Comm. Corp. & British Tel. plc,
Declaratory Ruling and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 3960 passim (1994). The knowledge that any
misconduct will be reported will disuade the merged company from engaging in it,
especially if competitors who review the information are large companies with experienced
research staffs.
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